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INTRODUCTION 
A national economy is a complex system with tightly integrated financial, industrial and 
demographical processes. When dealing with such a complex system, it is impossible to 
make forecasts that will precisely reflect the real economic situation in the future.  
Despite many different opinions and theories, when discussing deviation in the 
economic context, risk has to be considered.  
We live in an era where information has become one of the most valuable assets for any 
company, investor or politician. Information about the future is priceless. No one can be 
certain about the future, but one can try to predict events, trends, indicators, etc., with 
different levels of probability. When discussing probability, once again, risk has to be 
taken into account.  
The first chapter of this paper is dedicated to risk, risk propensity, risk perception, and 
risk-taking behavior in an economic setting, offering a review of literature and 
synthesized definitions of these notions. 
There are various definitions of ‘risk’ in social, mathematical, and economic sciences, 
however this paper will concentrate on its financial meaning.  Risk has been widely 
studied by a large number of mathematicians and economists. Section 1.1. will reveal 
and summarize the definition of ‘risk’ given by Markowitz (1952), March and Shapira 
(1987), Garland (2003), Frankfurter et al. (2002), and Ricciardi (2007). In this section 
compared are two main financial schools: normative and positive. The first one 
(Markowitz 1952; Neumann and Morgenstern 1947; Savage 1954), based on the 
assumption of rationality of economic agents, suggests measuring risk in relation to the 
expected return (Portfolio theory, Capital Asset Pricing Model). On the contrary, the 
school of behavioral finance implies limited rationality of economic agents and 
subjective risk assessment. The core theory in behavioral finance is the prospect theory 
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
!The main part of section 1.1 is dedicated to the characteristics of risk-aversion and risk-
taking as two building blocks of risk propensity. This section will compare and discuss 
the works of MacGrimmon and Wehrung (1986; 1990), March and Shapira (1987), 
Roszkowski and Davey (2010), Moreschi (2005), and Lucarelli and Brighetti (2010).  
The first chapter will present the critics of the “homo economicus” theory, which 
considers individuals to be rational. Section 1.2 will reveal biases, heuristics and 
paradoxes in the judgments of economic agents, based on the work of Sitkin and Pablo 
(1992), Gilovich et al. (2002), Korobkin and Guthrie (2004), Shefrin (2007), Hackbarth 
(2008), Akert and Deaves  (2010), Fairchild (2005), Heaton (2002), Graham and 
Harvey (2010), and Moon (2001). 
The review of literature on risk will show that research in this area has been completed 
mostly using statistical data from stock markets in the USA and studying individual 
investors’ behavior (Ricciardi 2007). Significant amount of research has been concerned 
with investment portfolios, stock market fluctuation, and companies’ dividend policy. 
However, modern finance is not limited to the stock market as various businesses 
become involved in financial relations through investment projects, loans, capital 
structure strategies, etc. In these organizations the financial executives are usually 
responsible for the financial decisions, and their views on financial issues form the 
financial strategy of the company, as well as influence the national economic climate. It 
is considered to be important to study financial behavior of the chief financial officers 
in different business environments. This problem is especially topical in the light of the 
financial-economic crisis of 2008, as it has shown the consequences of irrational and 
risky decisions of economic agents. Understanding of the factors that influence risk 
propensity, as well as compiling a profile of the key decision-makers’ risk preferences, 
might help to make better financial forecasts on the micro-level of a single firm and the 
macro-level of a national economy. 
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The theoretical concept of this study is based on the works of Sitkin and Pablo (1992), 
Graham et al. (2010), Sitkin and Weingart (1995), Weber and Milliman (1997), and 
Rohremann (2005). The paper introduces The Circular Model of Risk Perception that 
shows interrelation between risk propensity, risk perception and risk behavior, and their 
dependence on external factors, such as context, framing, personality, etc. The Circular 
Model of Risk Perception is presented and explained in section 1.4. 
There are not many research studies on risky behavior of financial executives. Section 
1.3 outlines the most significant studies for this paper, including MacGrimon and 
Wehrung (1986), Shapira (1986), Sullivan (1997), and Broomiley (1991). These and 
several other works have provided a basis for the design of the practical component of 
the current study. 
The second chapter is dedicated to empirical research. Presented are an analysis of 
business environment in Ukraine, Estonia and Sweden, as well as the design and 
conclusions of the research.  
Research has been carried out among chief financial officers (CFOs) and chief 
executive officers (CEOs) of companies in Ukraine, Estonia, and Sweden. Such 
companies as Tere AS, Salvete AS, Rapo AS, Radisson Resort Hotels, Sranfy, “ATC”,                
OÜ Õliühing, Trendwood, SA Võru Spordikeskus, Nimbell AB, Binar AB, Duego 
Technologies AB, «"#$%&'#( )$*%+,» and others have taken park in the research.  
Three countries were chosen as they represent different stages of economic 
development. Sweden – an old European country with stable economy, Estonia – a post 
Soviet country that has successfully revolutionized into market economy, and Ukraine – 
a country with transitional economy moving towards market. Objective data from the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), The World Bank, and the European 
Commission were used to analyze and compare economic conditions in the three 
countries. This is the first study into the differences in attitudes of financial managers 
towards risk carried out in several European countries.  
Author hypothesizes that business environment, organizational norms and culture would 
define risk propensity of managers. The aim of the thesis is to find out similarities, 
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differences and patterns of risk propensity of financial executives in different business 
environments by comparing financial executives relative risk propensity in Estonia, 
Sweden and Ukraine. Following objectives are set in order to reach the goal: 
• to analyze existing concepts of risk-taking behavior in economic setting; 
• to develop an aggregated theoretical framework of risk propensity; 
• to provide an analytical overview of previous studies; 
• to develop a questionnaire that allows to assess risk propensity of executives 
within the scope of a financial problem; 
• to present an overview of business environments of the three countries to 
comprise a profile of financial executive in Estonia, Sweden and Ukraine; 
• to compare risk-taking preferences between executives in three different 
countries. 
In this paper six pairs of hypotheses and suggestions on risk propensity of financial 
executives are tested. Questionnaire analysis has been completed and presented using 
graphical, statistical and mathematical methods.  
This paper introduces new factors related to problem framing that might influence the 
decisions of executives; such as general economic situation, previous performance of 
the company or the status of the market competition. Managers have to express their 
professional opinion about different investment opportunities for their firms in the 
conditions of either economic growth or recession. It is implied that from the financial 
point of view, the most important category is the value of the company. This is the first 
study where the outcomes of decisions are related to the changes in business value.  
Results from the questionnaire are compared across the different countries, and 
contrasted with the results of previous research. Conclusions, limitations of the study, 
and proposals for further research are discussed in the last section of this paper. 
Author would like to thank Andrei Lebedev, Anneli Kuusk, Andrei-Andy Linnas,    
Aino Linnas, Igor Morozov, Marko Mitt, Mark Kant!ukov, Mirjam Loertscher and 
“Helikoor”, “Duego Technologies”, Chalmers School of Entrepreneurship for amazing 
help with providing interviews, as well as all the respondents for their valuable and 
highly appreciated input. 
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1. RISK PROPENSITY IN FINANCIAL DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS: THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
1.1. Risk-taking behavior of individuals in economic setting: 
risk-taking versus risk avoidance 
In the middle of the 18th century, a famous French economist Richard Cantillon (1730) 
introduced a new term ‘entrepreneur’ into economic analysis. He described an 
entrepreneur as an independent risk-taking businessman. Cantillon (1730) mentions that 
some of the entrepreneurs get rich and “gain more than double their subsistence”, 
although “others are ruined and become bankrupt” (Saucier and Thornton 2012: 44-46). 
The risk here is related to uncertainty, “especially from competition and changing 
tastes” (Saucier and Thornton 2012: 55). 
Entrepreneurs have to make various decisions about resource allocation, pricing 
products and services, manufacturing possibilities, etc. As in any normative science, 
classical microeconomics have provided a range of theories that describe how rational 
people and firms have to make decisions that bring the most value to them and society 
(maximizing gains (utility) in the condition of limited resources). ‘Homo economicus’ 
with his ‘Utility function’ is one of the main paradigms in microeconomics that assumes 
individuals to be rational (follow axioms of rationality), having full information and 
being able to express order of their preferences or exact utility of each good (Dwivedi 
2002: 119). Nevertheless, in real life, information is never distributed equally among 
economic agents and no one owns full information. Further development of the utility 
theory took into account the ‘uncertainty effect’ in the form of risk. It is important to 
mention here that ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’ are not synonyms. Risk can be measured 
using probability but uncertainty cannot be (Ackert and Deaves 2010: 7).  
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The ‘expected utility theory’ developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) 
extends the concept of ‘rationality’ by implying that individual preferences can be 
presented by the function of expected utility that is based on subjective probabilities. 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) based their theory on the work of Jacob and 
Bernoulli, famous mathematicians of the 18th century (Nicholson and Snyder 2010: 209-
216). According to Bernoulli (1738), the expected value E(X) is a sum of all possible 
outcomes (xk) multiplied by probabilities of their occurrence (pk): 
(1)  ! ! ! !!!! ! !!!! !!! !!!! 
Bernoulli (1738), in turn, proposed utility to be a logarithmic function of wealth: 
(2) ! ! ! !"!!!! 
Savage (1954) proposed the ‘subjective expected utility theory’, which states that a 
decision preferred by an individual depends on his or her subjective utility function and 
beliefs about probability (Nicholson and Snyder 2010: 209-216). In the field of finance 
these concepts were reflected in the Modern Portfolio Theory of Harry Markowitz 
(1952: 77-91). Markowitz (1952) developed one of the basic investment theories that 
provides methods of analyzing securities portfolio based on their expected return and 
risk (standard deviation). An investor can choose whether to minimize risks given the 
expected rate of return or maximize the expected return given the level of risk. 
Until 1979, when “Prospect theory: And analysis of decision under risk“ by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky was published, economic decision-making had been 
normative, and had tried to find new instruments for people to use in their decision-
making process (Bell et al. 1988, Keeney et al. 1993). Prior to that publication, several 
works had studied psychological aspect of decision-making, e.g. Gustave le Bon (1896), 
Selden (1912), Festinger (1956), and Pratt (1964). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) revolutionized economic science with their experiments 
on decision-making, criticism of the expected utility theories, and statements saying that 
people are far from being rational. Consequently, the prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) was developed and became a point of departure in the development of 
Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Finance. 
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According to March and Shapira (1987), risk in financial science is most commonly 
defined as “reflecting in the distributions of possible outcomes, their likelihoods, and 
their subjective values” (March and Shapira 1987: 1404). The alternative with larger 
variation would be considered riskier as risk and expected value are important inputs in 
decision-making between alternative gambles. 
A distinction can be made between ‘objective’ risk that has been scientifically proven 
based on statistical and mathematical calculations (for example betas, calculated by 
Standard & Poor’s) and ‘perceived risk’ based on subjective impressions. Although 
people frequently have to deal with risky situations they have never experienced before, 
there is no statistical data or expert judgments on these issues, at the same time attitudes 
towards risk are also not logical. Frankfurter and George (2001) assume that there is 
“much more to risk than finance has begun to consider, and much of it involves how 
people form images of the events of which they are expected to assess the risk” 
(Frankfurter, George 2001: 456). 
Garland (2003) in his work “The rise of risk” emphasizes that risks as such are a “pro-
duct of future-oriented human calculations – assessments made by people in the face of 
an uncertain world and the possibilities that it holds for them”. Risk is tightly bounded 
with uncertainty, where individual possesses only limited knowledge about future 
events, mostly based on predictions, guesses, and probabilities (Garland 2003: 49-85). 
Garland (2003) assumes that risk could be managed on a micro level as “the 
uncertainties faced by firms are not truly random events” (Garland 2003: 20) because 
some patterns of human behavior can be predicted to some extent, for example demand 
levels, consumer attitudes, exchange rates, and production costs. Although this 
statement is arguable, especially after the financial and economic crisis of late 2008 that 
was unexpected for majority of firms, institutions, and households. In fact, the crisis 
was caused by inaccurate, overoptimistic calculations of risks, general tendency for 
underestimating level of risk in small-probability events, and overconfidence of the 
main players in financial markets (Roszkowski and Davey 2008). It can be argued that 
previous economic growth, growth of gains, market shares, etc., resulted in expecting 
the same tendency to continue in future (inertia); therefore economic agents were 
overestimating the probability of positive outcomes of their financial decisions. 
! 10 
That is why it is so important to study not only risk itself, but also risk propensity of the 
organizations’ key decision-makers. In microeconomic settings key decision-makers are 
company executives who define corporate strategy, debt policy, capital structure etc. 
The assembly of such firms and their strategies form trends and tendencies of the 
national economy as a whole.  
There are several recent studies dedicated to risk propensity and risk perception of 
households (Roszkowski and Davey 2010; Gärling et al. 2009). The main purpose of 
these studies was to show that people should get at least general financial education in 
order to be able to assess risk and make smaller number of irrational financial decisions. 
At the same time financial institutions themselves have to change the model of their 
risky behavior and be more focused on sustainable development than risk-taking and 
speculation. Roszkowski and Davey (2010: 42-53) argue that there is a strong need to 
differentiate and determine financial terms that describe willingness to take an action in 
the condition of uncertainty; among them ‘risk tolerance’, ‘risk acceptance’, ‘risk 
appetite’, ‘risk attitude’, ‘risk profile’, and ‘risk propensity’. 
Based on the investment vocabulary (Business dictionary; Investopedia; Ricciardi 2004; 
Rohrmann 2005, 2008), the following definitions related to risk in economic context 
were aggregated: 
! risk propensity, 
! risk tolerance, 
! risk perception, 
! risk behavior. 
Risk propensity shows the degree to which an entity is willing to take chances with 
respect to risk of loss. It is a general tendency (as a mindset) towards taking or avoiding 
risk when deciding on how to proceed in situations with uncertain outcomes (also called 
risk attitude). In other words, risk-taking and risk-aversion are two contrary 
characteristics generally called ‘risk propensity’.  
Risk propensity was the main research subjects in the work of MacCrimmon and. 
Wehrung (1986; 1990), Sitkin and Pablo (1992), Sullivan (1997), Wayne et al. (2001), 
Miner and Raju (2004), and others. Various studies have proven that depending on 
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individual risk propensity there are differences in people’s reactions and behaviors in 
situations involving risk (MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986), March and Shapira 
(1987), Frankfurte et al. (2001), and others. Individuals who prefer relatively lower risk, 
called risk-averse, might sacrifice some of the expected return if that would lead to 
decrease of variance of the return. On the contrary, the risk-seeking people would prefer 
higher return variance, while prepared to sacrifice some of the expected return (March 
and Shapira 1987: 1406). 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) proposed general characteristics of a ‘risk-taker’ 
and ‘risk-averter’. They are presented in the table 1.1 below.  
 
Table 1.1. Characteristics of Risk Averters and Risk Takers  
 
COMPONENTS 
of risk 
Risk Averter REQUIRES Risk taker ACCEPTS 
Magnitude of 
potential loss 
Low maximum loss 
Low stakes, commitment 
Low variability in payoffs 
More information on losses 
More control over losses 
Higher maximum loss 
Higher stakes, commitment 
Higher variability in payoffs 
Less information on losses 
Less control over losses 
Chances of 
potential loss 
Low chance of loss 
Familiar environment 
Few uncertain events 
More information on chances 
More control over uncertain 
events 
Low uncertainty 
Higher chance of loss 
Unfamiliar environment 
Many uncertain events 
Less information on chances 
Less control over uncertain 
events 
Higher uncertainty 
Exposure to 
potential loss 
Low exposure 
Shared responsibility 
More information on exposure 
More control over exposure 
Higher exposure 
Sole responsibility 
Less information on exposure 
Less control over exposure 
Other risk 
components 
Control by self 
Contingency plans 
Consensus 
Exit from risky situation 
Control by others 
No contingency plans 
Conflict 
Participation in risky situation 
Source: MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986: 19) 
The one who tries to avoid risk would choose opportunities that have low maximum 
loss and low variability in payoffs. He or she would require more information about 
potential losses and their likelihood, as well as would act more willingly in a familiar 
environment, where he or she has more control over the results. More often he or she 
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would prefer not to take risk and exit the risky situation. On the contrary, a risk-taker 
can accept higher variability in payoffs and higher losses. He or she is not afraid of 
acting in an unfamiliar environment, with less information and control over the 
outcomes. He or she can take responsibility and even accept conflicts, rather than 
always require consensus. Risk-taker would be willing to participate in a risky situation. 
The propensity to take or avoid risk plays a key role in the perception of risk and 
decision-making process.  
Risk tolerance is a term very closely related to risk propensity (sometimes a substitute). 
It defines the capacity to accept or absorb risk, or in the ‘portfolio theory’ – the degree 
of uncertainty that an investor can handle in response to a negative change in the value 
of his or her portfolio. 
According to Roszkowski and Davey (2010), risk tolerance is a fixed trait, but it can 
still be influenced by life circumstances and psychological conditions. The study 
showed that, for instance, risk tolerance of individuals was not affected by the crisis of 
2008, despite the change in risk perception. However, these conclusions are subject for 
further investigation, as the study was based on self-assessment. Moreschi (2005) and 
Lucarelli and Brighetti (2010) show that individuals usually fail to evaluate their risk 
tolerance appropriately because of biased judgment. For instance, individuals who assu-
me that they are risk-avoiders might exhibit risk-taking behavior in the situations invol-
ving uncertainty and risk. This phenomenon was called ‘unconscious sleeping factor’.   
The key literature presents two points of view on risk preferences. One assumes that 
risk preferences are stable (Lambert 1986; MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1990; Sitkin and 
Weingart 1995; Weber and Milliman 1997); another one implies that risk preferences 
can vary (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; March and Shapira 1992; and Bromiley 1991). 
Risk perception is a belief about likelihood, magnitude and/or timing of risk. It could be 
a rational or an irrational belief, held by an individual, group, or society. Likelihood 
expresses the chance of occurrence of the event, magnitude – the worst result that can 
occur and duration of its effect.  
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Ricciardi (2004) in his work “A Risk Perception Primer: A Narrative Research Review 
of the Risk Perception Literature in Behavioral Accounting and Behavioral Finance” 
provides a full chronological literature review and an overview of concepts on such to-
pics as risk and risk perception. Modern theories and models of risk perception can also 
be found in the studies of Brockma et al. (2006), Barberis (2008), and Roszkowski and 
Davey (2010); all of which emphasize the role of risk propensity of an individual in his 
or her perception of risk and actual risk behavior (the actual behavior of people in the 
situation involving risk). Risk behavior has been largely studied by March et al. (1987, 
1992), Sitkin and Pablo (1992), Gärling et al. (2009), Rohrmann (2008) and others.  
In any business as a whole and in corporate finance as such risk has a very important 
place. There are political risks, market risks, interest rate risk, reinvestment risk, 
liquidity risk, foreign exchange risk, credit or default risk, inflation risk, as well as 
firm’s specific risks, project risk, financial risk, business risk.  
Corporate managers make decisions involving risk every day, while taking bank loans, 
issuing securities, deciding on Initial Public Offering (IPO) or Mergers and Acquisitions 
(M&A), or accepting investment projects.  In the end all their decisions influence 
business value. One of the most widely applied risk-assessment techniques is the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) that takes into account the assets’ sensitivity to 
systematic (non-diversifiable) risk. 
Traditional financial approach also implies the use of discounted cash flow method 
(DCF) by financial officers in the decision-making process. Evaluation techniques 
involve inclusion of risk into discount rates (expected return and “objective” risk-betas) 
applied to expected cash flows. Despite the fact that different agencies, such as 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, evaluate risks for countries, industries, and separate 
companies, and publish historical beta values and financial forecasts, the final decision 
is still made by a CFO (or CEO), and quite often involves more intuition than a 
quantified approach. It should be noted that there is a large subjective component in the 
valuation and decision process, as expected (or estimated, perceived) values are 
discussed. It means that the firm behavior would depend on the decisions made by its 
financial officers, who, as humans, may be prone to making decisions that may not 
always be fully rational. 
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Corporate Finance focuses on two basic groups of financial agents – corporate 
managers and investors, and creditors and shareholders. In order to understand the 
decision-making process in concluding various financial contracts, it is important to 
understand their preferences and beliefs first. While classical theories (Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1947, Markowitz 1952) assume broad rationality of agents, their unbiased 
forecasts, as well as given market efficiency and precise reflection of information in the 
prices of financial instruments behavioral finance discusses these issues (Baker et al. 
2005). A significant part of behavioral finance is also dedicated to exploring of financial 
markets, corporate and individual investors. Core theories in this area are: limits of 
arbitrage, market efficiency, noise trade, implementation costs, etc. (Barberis et al. 
2001, Fama 1998, etc). This paper does not discuss the aforementioned theories as its 
focus is on another branch of behavioral finance - ‘irrational managers’ approach that is 
closely covered in the next section. 
 
1.2. Irrationality of managerial decisions: biases, heuristics and 
other effects 
Studies show that top corporate managers (CFOs, CEOs) can be focused on risk-taking, 
or be risk-averse; depending on their position towards risk, they might perceive risks in 
different ways. At the same time, there is evidence of pitfalls that usually prevent 
ordinary people and managers from making fully rational decisions and applying 
theoretical techniques correctly (Shefrin 2007: 2). 
Gilovich et al. (2002), Korobkin and Guthrie (2004), Shefrin (2007), Hackbarth (2008), 
and Akert and Deaves (2010), discuss general heuristics and biases of managers and 
their influence on financial and strategic decisions. Fairchild (2005), Sunder et al. 
(2009), Simon, et al. (2002), Graham and Harvey (2010) have carried out research into 
managerial overconfidence and optimism. Moon (2001) dedicated his works to the 
causes and consequences of the ‘sunk cost effect’. 
This paper presents an aggregated list of the most common psychological phenomena 
that demonstrates irrational behavior of managers: 
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1. Biases: excessive optimism, overconfidence, confirmation biases, illusion of 
control. 
2. Heuristics: representativeness, availability, and affect. 
3. Framing effects: loss aversion, aversion to a sure loss.  
Bias is a “predisposition towards error” (Shefrin 2007: 2), illogical or inaccurate judg-
ment. Recent research by Graham and Harvey (2010) has shown that managers tend to 
be more optimistic than other people; in other words, more predisposed towards exces-
sive optimism bias. They overestimate how frequently favorable outcomes will occur 
and the same time underestimate the frequency of negative (unfavorable) outcomes.  
Excessive optimism can lead to “delayed cost cutting during business recession” that 
may result in poor financial performance of the firm (Shefrin 2007: 2-5). This bias 
might affect managers’ investment judgments, so that they will believe that some 
projects are better than they really are and overinvest (Heaton 2002). At the same time, 
as they believe that the company’s securities are undervalued, they might not issue new 
securities to finance projects with positive net present value (NPV) and underinvest 
(Heaton 2002). More optimistic managers will be less willing to finance projects by 
external fund rising (Heaton 2002: 35). They generally prefer ‘pecking order’ capital 
structure – with first preference for internal equity, second for straight (risk free) debt 
and last for a new entity of any form (Harris and Raviv 1991; Graham and Harvey 
2001). All in all, excessive optimism of CFOs and CEOs results in value non-
maximizing, or even in value decreasing behavior.  
Overconfidence (Slovic 1964; Tversky et al. 1974; Moore et al. 2007) is another bias 
commonly widespread among financial managers. Overconfidence is a belief of a 
person that he or she is better (above average) than others, often resulting in mistakes 
being made more frequently (Shefrin 2007).  Scientific literature shows men to be more 
prone to overconfidence and risk-taking than women (Schubert et al. 1999). A recent 
theory developed by Moore and Healy (2007) distinguishes three different ways of 
describing overconfidence: overestimation of one’s actual performance, overplacement 
of one’s performance relative to others, and excessive precision in one’s beliefs. 
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Due to overconfidence bias managers might underestimate risks, ignore evidence of fai-
lure, and believe that they can do better. This leads to accepting negative NPV projects, 
providing destroying M&As, and reducing business value (Roll 1986; Shefrin 2007).  
Fairchild (2005: 20) shows that overconfidence can bring to a “positive effect by 
inducing higher managerial effort”. On the other hand, Hackbarth (2008: 861) found 
that mild biases can play a positive role and bring an increase in the firm’s value, 
“because higher debt levels commit the manager to pay out free cash flow ameliorating 
manager-shareholder conflicts”. 
Previous studies have shown mixed results about how overconfidence influences capital 
structure of a firm. Fairchild (2005) and Hackbarth (2008) show in their models that 
overconfident managers prefer to use debt financing (Fairchild 2005). At the same time 
Sunder et al. (2009: 22) state that “debt financing is relatively more expensive for the 
overconfident CEO and he is likely to face restrictions on subsequent financing”, so he 
or she would use less debt. Nevertheless, overconfident and overoptimistic people are 
usually “happier, more popular, more motivated and willing to help others” (Hackbarth; 
2008: 876).  However, overconfidence does not mean overoptimism, it emphasizes the 
belief that the individual point of view whether optimistic or pessimistic is correct, it is 
related to the inner “tune” of the person.  
Managers usually focus on the evidence that confirms their opinions, and are more 
likely to ignore the facts that contradict their opinion. They search for information that 
supports their beliefs, instead of searching for contradictory information. This pattern 
called ‘confirmation bias’ leads to an incomplete picture and may consequently result in 
faulty decisions (Nesma 2010) and decreased profits because of a delayed reaction on 
changing environment (Shefrin 2007). 
Langer (1975) introduced the ‘illusion of control’ phenomenon to psychological and 
economic science. According to the findings of Langer’s (1975) experiments conducted 
among 631 participants, the ‘illusion of control’ is the “expectancy of a personal 
success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant” 
(Langer 1975: 313). According to Montier (2007: 22), illusion of control refers to 
people's belief that they have “influence over the outcome of uncontrollable events". 
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From the managerial point of view “illusion of control” is a belief “that conventional 
controls, like operating standards, profit targets and budgetary criteria accurately and 
validly measure and determine behavior” (Marti et al. 2004: 83-96). This leads 
managers to overestimate the extent to which they can control future events, which may 
leads to higher than necessary costs (Shefrin 2007). March and Shapira (1987) showed 
that managers perceive risk as a controllable event that might be managed. That results 
in underestimating risks and overly optimistic prognosis of future cash flows, project 
pay-back time, etc.  
Heuristics are ways, methods, and rules that make decision process easier. People might 
not be aware of the fact that they are using heuristics as they do it on a cognitive level. 
Simon (2003), Kahneman and Tversky (2002), Griffin and Kahneman (2002) and 
others, have published key research on heuristics. Studying heuristics is very important 
for the understanding of financial decision-making process. Financial decisions are 
based on different assessments of occurring of the events: increase in earnings, interest 
rates prognosis, research and development (R&D) project success (Akert and Deaves 
2010: 90-91). Managers also make their judgments using heuristics, relying on 
stereotypes and analogues (Shefrin 2007). This kind of heuristics is called 
‘representativeness’. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979) people make 
judgments about the probability that event A belongs to process B, by the degree to 
which A resembles B. Shefrin (2007) defines ‘representativeness’ as reliance on 
stereotypes and shows that it can lead managers to wrong forecasts on investment 
projects and reducing the company value. For example: if IT companies dealing with 
application software (or Internet-based services) have low costs in first stages, then they 
are most likely to grow fast and shift to decline phase quite quickly. Relying on such a 
stereotype, a manager may underestimate project pay-back time, underestimate 
resources and time needed for development and engagement of significant market share, 
for example in an Internet-based medical service. 
In modern behavior finance term ‘representativeness’ was replaced by ‘attribution-
substitution’ (Kahneman and Frederic 2002) or prototype heuristic and similarity 
heuristic. Gilovich (Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment 2002) 
notice that ‘representativeness’ was considered in two different meanings; on the one 
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hand a prototype that represents the category and, on the other hand, the way it 
resembles the category stereotype. In order not to mix with or misinterpret the term it 
was divided into two different heuristics.   
Information is the key component in decision-making, allowing to make any predictions 
or judgments. For that reason, before making a decision one would seek some facts and 
knowledge on the topic. Nowadays, it is very easy to get a piece of information from 
radio, TV, Internet, etc. The availability heuristics is a tendency to use the most 
available, easily accessible or familiar information. For instance, when asked whether 
more people die because of terrorist attacks, hurricanes and tsunamis or because of 
asthma, most people would choose the first one. They are exposed to more information 
about disasters than about regular illnesses, and that influences their judgments (Gilbert 
2004). The availability heuristics leads to ‘recency’ and ‘salience’ biases, where people 
choose recent or widely spoken events as most representative (Akert and Deaves 2010).  
Managers also apply this heuristic and rely on information that is more ‘readily’ 
available, or that they can recall more easily. Recent research (Kliger and Kudryavcev 
2010: 50-65) has shown that a revision of analyst recommendation affects investors’ 
reactions in uncertain conditions. The availability heuristics might lead to the choice of 
wrong investment projects and reducing of the firm’s value, because of not accurate 
estimation of risks and misjudged priorities (Shefrin 2007).  
People usually form their opinions in relation to some reference point or initial number. 
In corporate context managers may make quick assessments based on an initial number 
they are familiar with, for example last year’s corporate growth or Price to Earnings 
(P/E) ratio, and then adjust it to reflect new information. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) 
called this pattern ‘anchoring and adjustment’ heuristic. Relying on this heuristics, 
managers would undervalue the difference between known and unknown value 
(Korobkin and Guthrie 2004: 744). It would consequently bring them to insufficient 
adjustments and biased growth forecasts that might result in reduction of the firm’s 
value (Shefrin 2007).  
In the edited version of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive 
Judgment” by Gilovich et al. (2002), ‘anchoring and adjustment’ was replaced by 
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‘affect’ heuristic on the list of most common heuristics, while Shefrin (2007) question 
this change and consider the ‘anchoring and adjustment’ heuristic to be of great 
importance.  
According to Gilovich et al. (2002: 470), the affect heuristic is more connected to 
emotions and intuition when people do what ‘feels right’. Similar tendency can be 
found in managers who invest in the projects that they feel will be a success, sometimes 
without a formal analysis. This behavior can reduce the firm’s value because of 
accepting projects with a negative NPV. Several experiments have shown that this 
heuristic is applied more intensively in stressful circumstances, for example under time 
pressure (Finucane et al. 2000).  
The expected utility theory assumes that people make consistent choices that are not 
influenced by external factors, although Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974 1979 2002) 
research findings have shown that this rule is violated by real-life human behavior. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) come to the conclusion that people show risk-aversion 
when making choices involving sure gains, and risk-seeking preference when making 
choices involving losses both in cases of monetary and non monetary problems (more 
thoroughly this is discussed in subchapter 1.3). Individuals are also predisposed towards 
‘loss aversion’ - it is a feature describing people’s greater sensitivity to wealth reduction 
than to its increase, in other words it refers to people’s tendency to strongly prefer 
avoiding losses to acquiring gains.  
Therefore choices might be manipulated by framing of the problem – gains versus 
losses, as well as personal versus business problems. Shapira (1986) and MacCrimmon 
and Wehrung (1986) have shown that people might accept higher risks when dealing 
with business decisions and, on the contrary, they show risk-averse behavior in 
questions that concern their personal life and finance. Hence, we should also clarify the 
term ‘framing’. Ackert and Deaves (2010: 14) define ‘frame’ as “decision-maker’s view 
of a problem and the possible outcomes”. The frame is affected by three factors: 
presentation, person’s perception of the question, and personal characteristics. This 
paper will address this definition as ‘broad framing’. On the other hand, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1974), Sitkin and Pablo (1992) refer to ‘framing effect’ or ‘problem framing’ 
only as to the presentation of the problem; this paper will use the definition of ‘narrow 
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framing’. In further discussion both definitions will be used and the next section will 
also investigate interrelation of the three aforementioned factors.  
Heuristics and biases usually appear together as they are tightly related to each other. 
For instance, aversion to loss together with framing affect leads to ‘sunk cost fallacy’, 
also known as “throwing good money after bad” (Shefrin 2007). 
The ‘sunk cost effect’ describes a situation where an investment project exceeds its 
budget and schedule, net present value of that project is no longer positive, and yet 
managers continue investing in its completion (Teach and Jones 2004). Managers 
mislead themselves into believing that ‘sunk costs’ are recoverable and so ‘aversion to 
sure loss’ encourages them to try to finish the project (Roxburgh 2003).  
Conlon and Garland (1993) in their work “The Role of Project Completion Information 
in Resource Allocation Decisions” suggest that sunk cost fallacy has to be divided into 
two different variables: already invested money (sunk costs) and the degree to which 
project was completed (project completion). Conlon and Garland (1993) have shown 
that if these two variables are considered separately, sunk costs will not play a 
significant role, as project completion rate would cause dominant influence on the final 
decision. However, Moon (2001) showed that “as the level of sunk costs increases, a 
decision-maker will be significantly more willing to invest further into a progress-
related project” (Moon 2001: 106). On the other hand, the second hypothesis that stated 
“as level of completion increases, a decision-maker will be significantly more willing to 
invest further into a progress-related project” was also confirmed. Although there are 
still no studies that clearly show the interaction of these two variables, Moon (2001) has 
elaborated several functions that might explain this mechanism.  
Conlon and Garland (1993) also considered the effect the information about com-
petitors’ product would have on sunk costs and project completion. However, the study 
did not show the evidence that information about competitors’ influence on decisions on 
resource allocation. One of the limitations of this research lies in the fact that it was 
conducted among students, not practicing managers. Authors suggest that in order to 
make specific conclusions, the same research has to be done on a sample of managers.  
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Understanding of all the previously mentioned “pitfalls” enabled various researchers 
(Conlon 1993, Garland 2003, Shefrin 2007, Moon 2001) and financial specialist 
(Roxburgh 2003, Teach 2004 etc) to develop suggestions and different techniques for 
managers to enable more rational and higher quality decisions. This research focuses on 
the CFOs and CEOs with economic education and assumes that they must know and be 
able to apply risk-assessing techniques. At the same time it is assumed that, due to 
different risk propensities, there will be significant differences in the financial decisions 
of managers. 
 
1.3. Measurement of risk propensity of economic agents – 
previous studies and approaches 
This chapter is dedicated to the most significant research on risk-taking behavior, as 
well as to the recent studies in the fields of risk perception, risk tolerance, and risk 
propensity of managers. Hereby works of Kahneman and Tversky (1974), 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986), March and Shapira (1987), Shapira (1997), 
Sullivun (1997), Bromiley (1991) are discussed. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) conducted several studies among students in order to 
explore whether their decisions were rational. They used a modified version of Allais 
choice-problems, where participants had to choose between several alternative variants 
of winning money (denoted as m. u. – monetary units). One example of the choice 
problems is presented below: 
Problem 1. Choose between 2 alternatives: 
A: Gain 2,500 m. u. with probability   0.33 B: Gain 2,400 m. u. with certainty 
     Gain 2,400 m. u. with probability   0.66 
     0 m. u. with probability    0.01 
Weighted gains: 
!! !!!""!!!!!! !!!""!!!!!! !!!!!" ! !!!"#!! !!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!""!!! 
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In this problem weighed gains are 2,409 m. u. for variant A and 2,400 m.u. for variant B 
(according to formula 1 and 3). 
According to the axioms of rationality, people should choose variant A that has higher 
weighed gains, but 82% of the study participants made an irrational choice and chose 
alternative B.  
Problem 2. Choose between 2 alternatives. 
A: 2,500 with probability 0.33        B: 2,400 with probability 0.34 
     0 with probability 0.67    0 with probability 0.67 
In this problem weighed gains are 
!! !!!""!!!!!! !!!!!" ! !"#!! !!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!""!!!!"! !!!!!! ! !"! 
82% of participants chose variant B, which seems to be logical, as it has higher 
weighted gains. But when participants’ choices are rewritten as preference equations, it 
can be seen that they are controversial: 
Problem 1. 
! !!!"" ! ! !!!""!!!!! ! ! !!!""!!!!! ! 
Equation might be modified in the following way: 
! !!!""!!!!! ! ! !!!"" ! !! !!!""!!!!! ! 
! !!!""!!!!! ! ! !!!""!!!!"  
Problem 2. 
! !!!""!!!!! ! ! !!!""!!!!" ! 
In Problem 1 the alternative of gaining 2,500 m. u. with probability of 33% was less 
preferable, than gaining 2,400 m. u. with 34% probability, while in problem 2 result 
was contradictory. 
Several more experiments have shown that more than half of the respondents violated 
expected utility theory. Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 265) called this phenomenon 
‘certainty effect’; which shows that “people overweight outcomes that are considered 
certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable”. Although in the situation 
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when gains were replaced by losses Kahneman and Tversky (1979) received different 
results. For instance, 92% of respondents preferred to incur losses of 4000 with 
probability of 80% to the certain loss of 3000, in spite of the fact that weighed loss in 
the first variant exceeded 3000. This pattern was named “reflection effect”. 
In their prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 271) also indicated the 
‘isolation effect’: “In order to simplify choices between alternatives, people often 
disregard components that the alternatives share, and focus on the components that 
distinguish them”. This effect appeared in the experiment, where participants were 
asked to consider a two-stage game: 
1st. stage: 0.75 probability of winning nothing and finish game 
  0.25 probability to go to the second stage 
2nd. stage: 0.8 probability of winning 4000 
  gaining 3000 for sure 
Participants had to make their choice in the 2nd stage before they knew the results of 
the 1st stage. 78% chose the variant of gaining 3000 on the second stage, thus it was 
concluded that people ignored the first stage of the game and made choice just between 
0.8 probability of winning 4000 or gaining 3000 for sure; and again variant “for sure” 
was more preferable. Although, when considering the final (two stages in total) 
probabilities, the choice should have been made between probability of (0.25
0.80)=0.2 to win 4000 and probability of (0.25 1.0)=0.25 to win 3000.  When the 
problem was presented in that way, 65% of respondents chose the first opportunity 
(4000, 0.2).  
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) offer the ‘basic risk paradigm’ (Figure 1.1) that 
formalizes a situation, where a person has to choose one out of two possibilities, where 
one of them is a ‘sure action’ – decision that doesn’t change situation, and another – 
‘risky action’ that has two possible outcomes: gain or loss. Thus decision-maker does 
not know which one will occur and has only probabilistic knowledge. The basic risk 
paradigm might be presented as a decision tree: 
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Figure 1.1. Basic risk paradigm (MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986: 12) 
 
Hence, expected (weighted, average) value of the ‘risky action’ can be calculated as: 
 
! !!!!!!!! ! ! !!! ! !!! !! !! ,  
 
where   p – chance (probability) of loss (L), 
( )p!1  – probability of gain (G). 
In their turn, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed two phases of the choice process: 
1) editing, 
2) evaluation and decision-making. 
Editing is based on simplifying the problem and includes the following operations: 
! Coding – perceiving outcomes as gain and losses, rather than as final welfare. 
! Combination – prospects are simplified by combining probabilities associated 
with identical outcomes. For example (200, 0.25; 200, 0.25) can be transformed 
into (200, 0.5). 
! Segregation – separation of riskless component. For example two alternatives 
(300, 0.8; 200, 0.2) are equivalent to setting (200, 1.0; 100, 0.8) where one of 
the choices does not contain risk. 
! Cancellation – discarding of common components. 
! Simplification – rounding of probability outcomes. 
! Dominance – rejecting of dominated alternatives without further evaluation. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) studied behavior of students who rarely find themselves 
in a situation involving financial risks. One can assume that financial managers with 
relevant education would behave more rationally. This assumption would not be 100% 
Sure action 
Risky 
action 
Gain outcome 
Loss!
"#$%"&'!
Sure outcome 
Chance of loss 
Chance of gain 
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correct as, in spite of the fact that CFOs have various instruments (mathematical, 
statistical, etc) to analyze risks and expected returns they still make very different 
decisions and usually rely upon intuition, but not solely on numbers.  
In 1986, MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) organized a study among top-level 
business executives (509 participants), in order to investigate the relationships between 
risk-taking propensity and variety of different socio-economic characteristics 
(MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1990: 422) of top managers. Risk propensity was found to 
be a very complex attribute that depends on different variables and conditions, so 
different aspects of personality have to be taken into account when assessing risk 
propensity. MacGrimmon and Wenhrung (1986) studied five dimensions: socio-
economic profile (age, education, income, etc), self-appraisal of risk-taking, 
standardized problems including risk (see the table 1.2), real behavior in situations 
involving financial risk, and personal and business decisions.  
 
Table 1.2. Standardized problems in MacGrimmon and Wehrung (1986) 
 
Standardized problems Description 
1) Risk In-Basket 
Examines the individual risk propensity, risk adjustment, choice 
between risky and sure alternative. 
Has high degree of realism. 
Example: the president of a subsidiary asks whether (s)he 
should settle a patent violation suit out of court or whether (s)he 
should fight the case (chances and losses are defined). 
2) Investment gambles 
Examines risk tolerance in risky situations. 
Example: a manager has to specify what ROI should investment 
project have, so that he would give up “sure” alternative on 
favor of “risky” one. 
3) Risk return rankings 
Examines risk perception.  
Example: a person has to rank 9 alternatives for investing 10% 
of his wealth. Rate of return and variance rate of return is 
provided. 
4) Real money wagers Ranking of alternatives (4 risky and 1 sure). 
Person has a real chance to win or lose money.  
Source: Compiled by author 
Questionnaire results were coded and analyzed using statistical methods such as 
correlation, discriminant analysis, factor analysis, etc., to prove a hypothesis that there 
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are “systematic differences between risk takers and risk averts on any socioeconomic 
dimensions” (MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986). 
After analysis the following conclusions were presented: 
1) people with greater success (income, savings) take greater risks; 
2) more mature managers (older, fewer dependents, longer stay in the position in one 
company) and managers in banks take lower risks; 
3) there is a difference in personal and business decisions: managers take business risk 
with greater willingness, and show stronger risk-aversion in the decisions involving 
their personal wealth; 
4) there is a greater willingness to take risks in the situation of threats rather than faced 
with opportunities; 
5) research has shown strong propensity towards risk-aversion among top managers; 
6) managers simplify the problems and use only part of the information given to make 
a decision; 
7) the study found some evidence of greater risk-taking among managers of small 
firms and ventures. 
However, MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) studies have several limitations. Size of 
the firm and the industry it is operating in were combined into one factor, and the study 
contained a disproportional amount of executives from big and small firms, which 
prevented the analysis from showing any significant results. The research was 
conducted in the USA and Canada, but it did not show any significant differences 
between top managers. It can be assumed that business climate and corporate culture in 
the USA and Canada are very similar and that is why the differences in risk propensity 
of managers were not significantly influenced by the regional factor. 
The present study assumes that the differences in culture and business environment 
would play a significant role in risk propensity of top managers. The study will include 
a comparison of three economies that are in different phases of development; mature 
market economy of Sweden, young and innovative market economy of Estonia, and 
transitional economy of Ukraine. 
In the first chapter the theoretical definition of the term ‘risk’ were discussed. Studies 
completed by Shapira (1997) shed light on the ways managers understand and perceive 
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‘risk’ in everyday life. Research has shown that managers associate ‘risk’ only with 
negative outcomes and not with all possible outcomes (variance). Thus managers 
perceive alternative as ‘risky’ if it contains hazard (threat) or very poor outcome (March 
and Shapira 1986: 1407). They also do not consider alternatives as ‘risky’ if they 
involve small sums of money; in other words, the possibility of loosing 10 euros is not 
risk, but a possible loss of 100 000 euros is a risk, so the amount matters.  
Managers see risk as a part of their job, as a synonym to “decision-making under 
uncertainty” (Shapira 1997: 58). In line with the results of MacCrimmon and     
Wehrung (1986) findings, Shapira (1997) found that “managers are inclined to show 
greater risk propensity towards risk-taking when questions are framed as business 
decisions than when they are framed as personal decisions” (Shapira 1997: 58). 
In the interviews carried out by Shapira (1997) and MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986), 
the CFOs stressed that smaller risk would be taken when a company is doing well and 
much riskier choices could be made, if a company is ‘failing’. Although managers were 
not eager to take risk “where a failure would jeopardize the survival of the firm” (March 
and Shapira 1987: 1410). At the same time, if there are competitors that could threaten 
the company’s position, manager has to take risk; but whether it would be risk of ‘not 
surviving’ or ‘risking new strategy’ is a matter of choice. 
March and Shapira (1987) stress that managers distinguish gambles and risk-taking. In 
gambling odds are determined and uncontrollable; on the contrary, in risk-taking, skills 
and information can reduce uncertainty. This attitude was proposed to be dictated by 
society that values ‘good risk-taking’ that leads to success. Conversely, judge gambling 
was suggested as the synonym to “bad risks” taking (March and Shapira 1987: 1413).  
When it comes to research on corporate executives and framing problems as financial 
decisions, one has to consider the fact that for CFOs and CEOs gains and losses take 
form of concrete financial terms – profit, revenue, costs, investments, etc. For instance, 
Sullivan (1997) suggested that when evaluating the cost of investment, project manager 
might seek for information about the cost of the project and consider revenues that the 
project will potentially generate. In this situation, positive net return is perceived as 
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‘gain’ and results in risk-avoiding behavior. Hence, problem framing gains one more 
dimension – coding of financial data.  
Sullivan (1997) conducted five experiments that examined managers risk propensity. 
The research has extended classical problems of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) by 
introducing notions such as profits, losses, revenues, costs and expenditures, as well as 
by complementing problems with ratings of the final choice (participants had to rate 
strength of their preference in five-point scale). The findings have shown that managers 
apply more advanced accounting techniques; in the conditions of profit and revenues 
managers prefer to avoid risk; and, on the contrary, when problems refer clearly to 
financial losses, they would exhibit risk-taking behavior.  
Although Sullivan (1997) framed the problems like specific financial choices there is a 
possibility of extending Sullivan’s experiments. Problems that were presented in the 
study were lacking concrete context, hence it can be assumed that external factors, such 
as general economic conditions or previous financial performance of the company 
would influence managers’ decisions, as managers should take these factors into 
consideration when facing a problem in real life. 
Bromiley (1991) studied organizational risk-taking and its influence on financial and 
economic performance of the firm for the strategic management purpose. Bromiley’s 
(1991) studies show that previous firm performance, financial decisions outcomes and 
expectations play important role in the future risk-taking behavior of the firm. 
The model of risk-taking elaborated in this research is presented below: 
! !!!"#$!!!! ! !!! ! !!!!!"#$%#&'()"! ! !!!!"#$%&'(!!"#$%#&'()" ! !!!!!"#!$%&%'()*
! !!!!!"#$%!&$'(" ! !!!!!"#$% ! !!!!!"#$%
!!
! !!!!!"#$!! ! ! 
The analysis was carried out using data on companies’ Return on Assets (ROA), Return 
on Equity (ROE), Return on Sales (ROS) as performance measures (as all the indicators 
provided similar results only ROA results were presented in the article). For the 
industry performance average ROA for the firms was used (firms with a given two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification code). Risk was measured as variance in ROA 
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(around timeline) – ex ante uncertainty of firms earnings streams. Expectations 
corresponded to the mean of the earnings forecast produced by security analysts. 
Aspiration combined past performance and industry average performance (firms 
performing below industry average aspire to average and those that perform above 
average aspire to improve positions). Slack was calculated as current assets/current 
liabilities ratio and recoverable slack as selling and all expenses/ sales ratio. 
The following conclusions were presented: 
1) Previous company’s performance as well as past industry performance has a strong 
negative influence on risk-taking (see also Bowman and Singh1993).  
2) Expectations and aspirations have positive influence on risk-taking: the higher the 
expectations, the higher risks a company takes. 
3) Risk has negative influence on performance, as those firms that take more risk show 
worth performance results.  
4) Previous risks have positive influence on current risk-taking. This leads to the 
situation where low business performance results in taking higher risks, and higher risks 
lead to decrease of the performance.  
Bromiley’s (1991) research has shown interesting and significant results, although not 
entirely in the same line with other studies, for instance Singh (1986). However, there 
are several limitations of the research. One of them is that the study was carried out in 
one country, so that the behavior of the firms might have been dependent on general 
economic tendencies. The study was conducted ‘from the distance’, without 
collaboration with the managers of the firms. On the one hand this approach was 
supposed to show objective results, based only on numbers; however, on the other hand, 
certain decisions are made by particular people and their attitudes towards risk play key 
role in the final risk-taking behavior. That is why the current study will test several 
similar hypotheses from the perspective of the managers of the firm and combine them 
with the design of the research Sullivan (1997).  
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1.4. The role of risk propensity in decision-making process – an 
integrated picture  
In the scientific literature there are only several models that describe mutual 
dependency of risk propensity, risk perception, and risk-taking behavior. One of them is 
the ‘Reconceptualized Model of the Determinants of Risk Behavior’ by Sitkin and 
Pablo (1992). They were the first to show the contradiction in different research and 
theories involving risk behavior. For instance, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) stated 
that individuals who try to protect their previous gains are risk-averse. On the contrary, 
Osborn and Jackson (1988) and Thaler and Johson (1990) found that past success brings 
to willingness to take risks. Staw et al.’s (1981) findings also contradict with Kahnemn 
and Tversky’s ‘prospect theory’ (1979), which proposes that individuals become risk-
averse when they are threatened with losses. Sitkin and Pablo (1992) emphasize that the 
main reason why previous studies resulted in controversial conclusions was that they 
were focused on single determinants of behavior, like individual, organizational, or 
problem-related characteristics. They also anticipated direct influence of those factors 
on risk behavior. Thereby the authors assume that the influence is indirect, “via 
mediating mechanism of risk propensities and risk perceptions” of individuals, and they 
place those notions in the center of the reconceptualized model among eight factors, 
aggregated from different studies (Figure 1.2).  
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Figure 1.2. Reconceptualized Model of the Determinants of Risk Behavior (Sitkin and 
Pablo 1992: 15) 
In their review of previous research, Sitkin and Pablo (1992) elaborated eleven 
propositions that describe the influence of different factors on risk propensity, risk 
perception, and risk behavior. 
Propositions 1-3 describe risk propensity determinants that might be assembled into one 
group of ‘personal characteristics’. For instance, general preferences to take risk or not 
would be consistent with the risk propensity in the particular situation. Individuals are 
also predisposed towards inertia in their behavior; in other words, they would handle 
risky situations in the habitual way. However, risk propensity would depend on the 
previous outcomes history. Once decision-maker associates his or her success with risk-
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averse actions he or she has taken, his or her risk propensity will become even more 
risk-averse, and vice-versa; successful risk-takers increase risk-seeking behavior. On the 
contrary, unsuccessful outcomes would lead to changes in the behavior strategy. Thus, 
the type of experience itself, magnitude and timing (schedule) of the “failure”, plays an 
important role (Figure 1.3). 
 
  Timing (schedule of Failure Outcomes) 
Magnitude 
(Scale of Failure 
Outcomes) 
 Intermittent Continuous 
Minor 
Major 
Experimentation Random reaction 
Escalating commitment Learned Helplessness 
    
Figure 1.3. The effect of outcome history on the variability of risk propensity (Sitkin 
and Pablo 1992: 19) 
Minor failures would result in increased variability of risk propensity; at the same time 
major and continuous failures lead to ‘learned helplessness’ and decreased risk 
propensity variability. 
Pablo and Sitkin (1992) presume (proposition 4 and 11) that there is an inverse relation 
between risk propensity and risk perception. Risk-averse decision-maker will perceive 
risks to be higher in comparison with risk-seeking individual. The former would tend to 
overestimate the risk, while latter would underestimate it. Pablo and Sitkin (1992) 
emphasize five more determinants that influence risk perception of decision-maker, 
among them: top management team homogeneity, organizational control system, and 
social influence. 
Current study focuses on CEOs and CFOs as decision-makers, in other words key 
personalities that define corporate behavior, organizational culture, leadership style, etc. 
Graham et al. (2010) study is one of few that explore both personal traits of companies’ 
executives and specific features of the company, exploring interrelation of these 
notions. The study uses a number of psychometric tests of CEOs and CFOs and link 
results to the capital structure and quantity of M&A. The study has shown that the 
CEO’s personal (behavior) traits, such as risk-aversion, optimism etc. are closely related 
to the general corporate finance policies, compensation and reward strategy and growth 
opportunities. In addition Graham et al. (2001) found out that the top US managers 
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generally differ from non-US managers and there are differences in personal 
characteristics and carrier path of CEOs and CFOs.  
The current study suggests that CEOs and CFOs risk propensity would be consistent 
with corporate values and organizational culture. From the perspective of an 
international study, organizational culture and determinants such as top management 
team homogeneity, organizational control system and social influence would be defined 
by socio-economic properties of the country – cultural aspects, as well as business 
environment.  
The more homogeneous top-management team, the more its individual members will 
exhibit risk perceptions that are similar and tend to be extreme. At the same time 
members will be more confident in the accuracy of their own judgment. In contrast, in a 
diverse management team the average risk perception would be less extreme and its 
members would exhibit less confidence in their perception. Risk perception of the 
individuals in the groups would depend upon organizational culture, risk values, and 
risk behavior (role-model) of the leaders, as well as of the control system. The greater 
the emphasis on process controls in organizations, the lower the level of risk perceived 
by decision-makers; the greater the emphasis on outcome controls in organization, the 
higher level of risk perceived by decision-makers. (Pablo and Sitkin 1992:16) 
Wiseman and Gomes-Mejia (1998) formalize behavior of managers within 
organization, combining the prospect theory with the agency model. They suggested a 
Behavioral Agency Model Of Managerial Risk-taking (BAM) that describes the 
dependence of managers’ risky behavior on the internal corporate governance and its 
key elements; incentive alignment and monitoring control. The model implies that an 
executive manager’s risk preferences are displayed through his or her strategic choices. 
As mentioned before, problem framing in its narrow definition affects the judgment of 
an individual. However, different studies show contradictory results in defining nature 
of the connection. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), when the problem is 
‘positively‘ framed, individuals perceive risk to be higher than is normally appropriate, 
whereas ‘negatively’ framed situations will be perceived as involving lower than 
normally appropriate level of risk. Although Staw et al. (1981), March and Shapira 
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(1987) came to opposing conclusions. Thus, both hypotheses will be tested in the 
present study.  
Problem framing might correspond not only to positive or negative outcomes, but also 
to the opportunities and threats, or for absolute versus relative outcomes. For instance, 
modest profit of the company might be considered as a ‘loss’ in comparison with an 
outstanding performance of the competitors. Similarly, a 10% decrease of wealth might 
be perceived differently from the absolute number of loss etc. 
Problem domain familiarity mediates personal characteristics of an individual and the 
essence of the problem. Whether the decision-maker has already been in the particular 
situation and has applied different techniques for analysis would influence his or her 
risk perception. Thus, the present study considers the domain familiarity to be one of 
the personal characteristics that affect risk propensity, along with the outcome history 
and inertia.  
According to Sitkin and Pablo (1992), decision-makers with moderate domain 
familiarity would have more accurate estimates and moderate level of confidence, as 
well as stable risk perception. In the follow-up practical test Sitkin and Weingart (1995: 
14) proved that risk perception and risk propensity are mediators between different 
factors (effects) and decision-making behavior. This result was also supported by 
Weber and Milliman (1997) study. Hence, the real risk behavior is consistent with the 
risk propensity of decision-maker. If an individual is risk-averse he or she would also 
exhibit risk-averse behavior. However, risk propensity is negatively connected to risk 
perception, which means that the “higher decision-maker’s risk propensity, the lower 
the level of perceived situational risk” (Sitkin and Pablo 1992; Sitkin and Weingart 
1995). Sitkin and Pablo (1992: 30) also suggest that “the higher level of perceived risk, 
the stronger the association between risk propensity and risk behavior, except that for 
risk-seeking decision-makers this effect will reach a limit defined by their propensity”.  
The “Structural Model: The context of risk attitudes” by Rohremann (2005) also 
considers risk perception and risk propensity to be two factors that define risk behavior. 
Both risk propensity and risk perception depend on the context (wide framing) that 
might be, for example, personal, societal or cultural (Figure 1.4). 
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Figure 1.4. Structural model: The context of risk attitudes (Rohrmann 2005: 4) 
The strength of risk propensity or risk-aversion depends on the type of hazard. 
Rohremann (2005) shows that physical, financial, social risk hazard will result in 
different levels of risk propensity. Mindset, motivation, and other personal 
characteristics (impulsivity, sensation seeking, extraversion) influence risk attitudes as 
well; however, the mechanism of risk propensity’s impact on the actual risk behavior 
has not been clarified yet.  
On the contrary, Weber and Milliman (1997: 142) found that “risk preferences may be a 
stable personality trait” and that change in the risky behavior is caused by the change of 
risk perception, depending on the situation. They conducted two experiments in order to 
investigate whether risky behavior of decision-maker would differ, depending on the 
context – time loss/gain versus monetary loss/gain. 
Rohrmann (2005) shows that cultural influence results in different levels of both risk 
propensity and risk perception of the community members (data collected in Germany, 
Switzerland, China). International research of Weber and Hsee (1998) also showed 
significant differences in risk behavior of decision-makers in China, USA, Germany, 
and Poland. Weber and Hsee (1998) explored the investment context – looking into 
pricing of risky options by the respondents.  
Rohrmann’s Structural Model (Figure 1.4) shows that individual will pass through a 
‘risk appraisal’ phase before taking any action. On this phase applied heuristics and 
biased judgment might result in non-rational behavior.!
The “Reconceptualized Model of the Determinants of Risk Behavior” by Sitkin and 
Pablo (1992); the “Structural Model: The Context of Risk Attitudes” by Rohremann 
(2005); and the aforementioned research (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; MacGrimmon 
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and Wehrung 1986; Sitkin and Weingart 1995; Shefrin 2007; and others), were used as 
a basis for developing the Circular Model of Risk Propensity (Figure 1.5) that shows 
interrelation between risk propensity, risk perception and risk behavior, and their 
dependence on external factors. The model is determined by the assumption that 
external factors do not have exclusive direct influence on the separate elements of risk 
behavior, but they are related to each other. In other words, each factor has its own 
affect on every element, whether directly or via mediating role of other elements. Hence 
the 360 degree model.  
 
Figure 1.5. The Circular Model of Risk Propensity (designed by author). 
This paper suggests that context (wide framing) would be the most general factor that 
defines nature of other factors connected to risk behavior. Context is collective notion 
that includes several layers: 
CONTEXT 
Country: socioeconomic conditions, culture. 
Problem scope: physical, financial, social. 
Decision domain: personal, household, business, national etc. 
Decision-maker: individual, group. 
The present study focuses on the financial problem scope within business domain. It 
suggests that organizational characteristics should be included into the general context, 
because organizational characteristics on macro level would depend on the country, its 
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business environment, business culture, social and business norms. This study, while 
comparing countries, would focus on general economic conditions, business 
environment and organizational culture; all these notions are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Context seamlessly comes to lower level – framing (narrow framing). Framing refers 
directly to a description of the problem decision-maker is faced with, in academic 
studies it is influenced by the researcher. However, outside of the academic domain, 
decision-maker might frame (formalize) the problem himself.  Framing includes several 
alternatives of formulation of the problem (question): 
FRAMING 
Negative (losses, threats) or positive (gains, opportunities). 
Absolute or relative. 
With reference point or without. 
Other. 
The actual risk behavior of the individual would certainly depend on the personality of 
decision-maker. However, personality is a complex category that among others include 
following aspects: 
PERSONALITY 
Social-demographic characteristic: gender, education, family, income etc. 
Qualities: extraversion, introversion, optimism, pessimism, perfectionism. 
Preferences: certainty, risk, habitual, random. 
History: outcome history of previous decisions, experience in certain field, 
domain familiarity. 
Inertia: certain standard way of handling risky situations. 
Personality combines various characteristics of individual, but in the current study the 
most important personality trait is risk propensity that in its turn defines risk perception 
of decision-maker.  
One should take into account that before making an actual decision, individual would 
assess risks and possible outcomes, in this phase, while editing and evaluating he or she 
would use heuristics and biased judgments. 
Context (both wide and narrow) and personal characteristics would affect risk-taking 
behavior of individual via mediating mechanism of risk propensity and risk perception. 
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The risk propensity of an individual can be assessed by analyzing income factors and 
outcome risk-taking (avoiding) decisions.  
Risk is one of the key categories in modern Behavioral Finance. There are many 
theories that give instruments for objective risk assessment, although decisions, made 
by economic agents are subjective and usually biased. Risk- taking decisions depend on 
various factors – context, problem framing, personal characteristics, that were 
aggregated in Circular Model. Hereby risk-propensity plays one of the most important 
roles, defining risk perception and risky decisions.  An empirical study that investigates 
cross-country differences in risk propensity of financial executives was designed 
according to the elaborated Circular Model of Risk Propensity and is discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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2. RISK PROPENSITY OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL 
EXECUTIVES IN ESTONIA, UKRAINE AND SWEDEN – 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
2.1. Business environment properties in Estonia, Ukraine and 
Sweden 
The main purpose of this study is to find out similarities, differences and general 
patterns of risk-taking behavior and risk propensity of financial executives in different 
countries. The Circular Model of Risk Propensity introduced in the previous chapter 
suggests that in order to get a full picture of the research ‘context’, and to be able to 
make assumptions on the influence that economic characteristics would have on 
economic agents, one should investigate properties of the country where the research 
takes place. The current paper will compare countries through three dimensions, 
whereas differences within these dimensions would affect not only the general way of 
doing business, but also personal characteristics of economic agents, such as risk 
propensity: 
1. General economic conditions: level of the development of market economy and its 
institutions, socio-economic and political stability, openness of the economy and its 
dependence on world trends; 
2. Business environment: ease of doing business, access to financial resources and 
investment opportunities, rule of law and transparency; 
3. Organizational culture: power distance, individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity 
versus femininity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, management and 
control. 
Current research was completed in three countries: Sweden, Estonia and Ukraine. These 
countries were chosen as they represent three different types of economies (see the 
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Table 2.1 below). Sweden has highly developed market economy and is one of the 
strongest and eldest Western European economies. Estonia has successfully passed 
through transition from centralized economy and now it represents young, very open, 
innovative and growing market economy. Ukraine has not yet finished transformation 
into full market economy and a lot of market institutions and mechanisms are still being 
developed. 
 
Table 2.1. Sweden, Estonia, Ukraine – cross-country comparison of economic 
conditions and business environment 
 
General economic conditions Sweden Estonia Ukraine 
Socio-political stability High Medium Low 
Risks Low Medium/Low High 
Level of development of market 
economy High High Medium 
Openness of the economy High High Medium 
Economic competitiveness High High Low 
Economy growth Stable/ Medium Unstable/ High Unstable/Medium 
Business environment Sweden Estonia Ukraine 
Level of economic freedom High High Low 
Easiness of doing business High High Low 
Level of investment freedom High High Low 
Transparency level High Medium Low 
Protection by rule of law High High Low 
Government interfering in economy Medium Low High 
Source: Compiled by author 
Sweden is both politically and economically stable, however due to its openness 
(Bryant 2012) it has suffered as a result of the world financial declining trends twice 
during the last 20 years. Sweden has successfully recovered from the financial crisis of 
2008 (IMF 2011; Bryant 2012) and has established the Financial Stability Fund in order 
to prevent future shocks. All economic institutions are highly developed and stand out 
due to efficiency, transparency, trust and strength (WEF 2011). Swedish knowledge and 
innovation-led economy is considered to be one of the most productive and competitive 
in the world (WEF 2011). It also has the highest credit rating AAA (S&P 2011), which 
shows its ability to cover all liabilities. In such conditions, where macro-economic risks 
are low, and the economy is stable and growing, companies feel more secure and are 
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more certain about the future. Therefore, it is suggested that managers of Swedish 
companies would tolerate risk, feeling insured against losses, and would show a higher 
level of risk propensity than managers from less stable countries.  
Estonia differs from other Baltic and Eastern European countries by the high level of 
competitiveness of its economy (WEF 2011), due to healthy public finance, stable 
financial institutions, developed labor and goods market, as well as development of 
technologies and education. Since 2006 it had been among the world’s fastest growing 
economies until the financial crisis hit the country, and it is predicted to be leader in 
economic growth in Eurozone (Ernst & Young 2011). Joining Eurozone resulted in 
absorbing the risks of the European sovereign-debt crisis. However, Estonia received 
high credit rating AA (S&P 2011) due to its economic growth and solid public finance 
(Bloomberg 2011). Estonia is a very open country, dependent both financially and 
trade-wise upon other European Union countries (Finland, Germany, Sweden, Latvia 
and Lithuania) and Russia. Estonian companies have experienced both positive and 
negative sides of openness of the economy. On the one hand, Estonian companies 
received access to financial resources, credits, investments and grants from the 
European Union (EU) that stimulated high economic growth. In addition, Estonia got 
financial help and backup by biggest Swedish banks during crisis. On the other hand, 
unexpected limitation of external monetary inflow to the country resulted in a sharp 
decline of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), growth of unemployment and strong credit 
problems. Although Estonia is politically stable, historically it has had a very cautious 
relationship with the Russian Federation. The aforementioned conditions may affect 
companies and their managers who would feel less secure than Swedish executives and 
exhibit higher levels of anxiety that would result in relatively more risk-averse behavior.  
The EU and the USA granted market economy status to Ukraine at the end of 2005 
(KMU 2005); however, until now not all institutions of market economy have been 
developed. The latest reports of The Heritage Foundation (IEF 2012) show that 
Ukraine’s economy is on the 163rd position out of 165 countries according to economic 
freedom and is categorized as “repressed economy”. Market institutions are not 
independent and transparent, and around 40% of economy is “in shade” (-$./0*#1: 
40%... 2011). Ukraine is also politically unstable, as during the last eight years Ukraine 
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has experienced revolution and various political shocks. Ukrainian managers name 
political instability as one of the major factors constraining business environment (IFC 
2008). Ukraine’s economy is highly dependent on the Russian Federation, as well as on 
the financial help from the European Funds and the World Bank. The EU and WTO 
integration process is still unclear for Ukraine and it is characterized by high level of 
uncertainty. Standard&Poors (2012) assigned “highly speculative” credit rating (B+) to 
Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine has high growth potential, due to big consumer 
market, expected reforms in land law, efficient labor market, and WTO perspectives. 
Unstable macroeconomic situation and other business threats make Ukrainian 
companies work in conditions of high uncertainty, it can be suggested that managers 
would try to avoid risks and exhibit risk-averse behavior in order to minimize risks.  
Healthy business environment in a country would facilitate company development and a 
guaranteed reduction of business risks. In contrast, unstable and unhealthy business 
conditions would create barriers, uncertainty and additional risks for business 
development. Managers of companies are used to working in specific business 
conditions of their country, they look at business tasks and problems through the prism 
of their experience. That is why it is important to compare business environments in the 
countries in order to understand the differences in risk propensity and risky choices of 
managers in the three countries. This study will discuss most recent data and will look 
into trends of the last 10 years. 
The International Finance Corporation together with the World Bank carries out annual 
research in 183 world economies in order to measure business regulations and the ease 
of doing business. Sweden’s 14th position in 2012 indicates that there are no regulation 
barriers that prevent companies from development and growth.  For instance, only three 
procedures and fifteen days are required to start a new business and the rules of getting 
all required licenses and permits are clearly defined (Doing business 2012). Sweden has 
a high index of economic freedom (71.9 out of 100) and it is ranked 21st among 179 
countries (IEF 2012). It has a high level of investment freedom, meaning that financial 
resources are moving within and out of country without barriers. The rights of small 
investors and minority shareholders are well protected (Doing Business 2012), and in 
2011 the Swedish government implemented several changes that have strengthened 
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investors protection. Although the Swedish court system is reliable and independent, the 
complexity and duration of the process of resolving commercial disputes is higher than 
average in the Nordic region. Sweden has lower position (54th) than Estonia [29th in the 
“enforcing contracts” ranking (Doing Business 2012)]. However, corporate risks in 
Sweden are relatively lower than in Estonia, and much lower than in Ukraine, due to a 
strong rule of law, high transparency of transactions, and protection of property rights. 
Sweden is one of the least corrupted countries in the world, scoring 92.0 out of 100, 
where 100 stands for “totally free from corruption” (TI 2010; IEF 2012). This shows 
that Sweden is a country with secure and stable environment, where private investors 
and corporate rights are well protected. Business environment has not changed 
significantly during past decade, although slight liberalization and an increase of law 
protection have taken place (Appendix 1), resulting in increasing business freedom (Fig. 
2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1. Estonia, Sweden and Ukraine – Business Freedom Rank, 1995-2012 (IEF 
2012) 
Estonia has the 24th position in the Doing Business ratings (2012), showing very good 
results in simplifying different procedures in starting a business and registering 
property, at the same time procedures connected to obtaining licenses and construction 
permits are still relatively complicated. However, Estonia has a higher rank than 
Sweden in the Economic freedom ratings (Fig. 2.2), due to the limitation of the 
government presence in economy. In addition, Estonia has a lower rate of government 
spending, as well as lower tax rates (IEF 2012; Doing Business 2012).   
• Estonia
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• World average
• Ukraine
Business Freedom
Free
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Repressed
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Figure 2.2. Estonia, Sweden and Ukraine – Economic Freedom Rank 1995-2012 year 
(IEF 2012) 
Investment freedom in Estonia is as high as in Sweden (Fig. 2.3), making nearly no 
distinction between foreign and national investors, as foreign capital is crucial for 
Estonian economy. 
 
Figure 2.3. Estonia, Sweden and Ukraine – Investment Freedom Rank, 1995-2012 year 
(IEF 2012) 
Protection of the investors is still relatively low (rank 65) and no significant reforms 
have been made in recent years (Appendix 1). However, Estonian investors and owners 
of the companies are eager to reinvest into development of the firms due to special 
taxation system, as undistributed profit is not taxable. The Estonian court system is 
independent; there is a secure and transparent procedure of enforcing contracts. During 
the last 7 years Estonia has shown good results in fighting corruption (Fig. 2.4), but it is 
still not as free from corruption as Sweden (CPI 2011 – rank 24 and 4, respectively). 
Economic Freedom Overall Score
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• Ukraine
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Figure 2.4. Estonia, Sweden and Ukraine – Freedom from Corruption Rank 1995-2012 
year (IEF 2012) 
Generally Estonia has a healthy business environment, with various reforms introduced 
during the last decades to help to establish solid institutions and to simplify bureaucratic 
procedures, as well as to insure free movement of goods, capital, and labor across 
boarders. Small and open economy proved itself to be a very flexible and adaptive to 
external shocks. After several years of recovery from the financial crisis, Estonia has 
come back to stable growth positions. 
Unlike Estonia, Ukraine has not shown significant progress in providing effective 
business environment. Because of weak protection of property rights, widespread 
corruption and an increase in the government role in economic processes, Ukraine 
reckons among countries with repressed economies (Fig. 2.2). Bureaucratic procedures 
are very complicated and costly, tax codes have been adopted only recently and it still 
demand a lot of improvements, loans are very expensive, and there are nearly no other 
forms of financing business, land law has not been adopted yet. During the recent years 
the government’s interference in business has increased by introducing price 
regulations, influence on prices through state owned companies (IEF 2012), and 
broadening tax authorities. Central Bank and juridical institutions are strongly 
influenced by the government. According to the IFC and the World Bank (Doing 
Business 2012) Ukraine has the worst rating in the areas of receiving construction 
permits and paying taxes (ranks 180 and 181 out of 183). Starting a business, registering 
property, and resolving insolvency ranks are ranked extremely low as well (112 166 156 
place among 183 countries).  
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• Ukraine
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Absence of the success of reforms might be caused by widespread corruption (Fig. 2.4). 
According to the Transparency International (TI 2010; 2011) corruption perception 
index (CPI) in Ukraine scores only 2.4, which indicates widespread perception of 
corruption. Enterprise survey (IFC 2008), held by the IFC and the World Bank in 2008, 
showed that 50% of companies perceive corruption to be the main constraint for 
business.  
The Heritage Foundation (2012) ranked Ukraine as 163rd (among 179 economies) by 
economic freedom. After several years of liberalization and improving trends in 
economy in 2002-2005, Ukraine returned back to positions of1998 (Fig. 2.2). The worst 
situation is with investment freedom that has declined significantly in the past three 
years (Fig. 2.3), as investment framework is undeveloped and investors’ rights are 
poorly protected (IEF 2012; Doing Business 2012). The above facts describe Ukrainian 
business environment as unhealthy, containing a lot of risks because due to insufficient 
legal protection of property and investments, poor availability of financial resources for 
majority of firms, and numerous barriers for foreign capital trying to reach Ukrainian 
companies, etc. In such conditions it is unclear what level of risk propensity Ukrainian 
managers would have. The present study suggests that risk propensity of Ukrainian 
managers would be either extremely risk-averse, or extremely risk-taking. Several 
hypotheses will be tested in the study.  
Sweden, Estonia and Ukraine differ not only on the economic level but also on the 
socio-cultural level, and that might also influence risk propensity of managers. Pablo 
and Sitkin (1992) suggested that the top management team homogeneity and 
organizational control system would influence risk perception, Hofstede (2001) noticed 
that uncertainty avoidance is unequally distributed within different cultures,  Rohrmann 
(2005) showed that the cultural context determines risk propensity of individuals, 
Graham et al. (2010) found that managers with different levels of risk propensity join 
companies with different reward and compensation systems. Based on these and other 
findings it can be suggested that in order to obtain a complete picture of differences and 
similarities between the countries, it is important to explore the corporate culture in 
Sweden, Estonia and Ukraine. The extended Hofstede 5-Dimensions model is used as 
the base for cross-country comparison (Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2. National Cultural Dimensions: Sweden, Estonia, Ukraine 
 
Source:  geert-hofstede.com (2012), Pylypenko et al. (2012). 
Power distance is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally” (geert-hofstede.com). All three countries score low on this 
dimension, indicating a tendency to joint decision-making and low dependence on 
supervisor. Swedish companies prefer flat corporate structure with hierarchy only for 
convenience; managers are differentiated by the level and field of work, rather than by 
pure hierarchic status. Leaders in the companies play the role of ‘coaches’ and 
acknowledge employees to be better specialist in their field (geert-hofstede.com; WBC 
2012).  Control in Swedish organizations is weak and power is highly decentralized; 
attitude of employees towards supervisors is relatively informal. Decisions in 
companies are based on consensus and involve all members of the group in the 
decision-making process.   
Power Distance Index (PDI) in Estonia is higher than Sweden, due to the fact that 
Estonia has only recently finished its transition from a centralized economy; thereby the 
subordinate relationship in the companies are more hierarchic, especially among older 
generation. However, Estonians welcome managers who give them the opportunity to 
take part in the decision-making process, and to express their opinion and disagreement. 
In Ukrainian companies decisions are made by top-managers and their decision power 
covers all levels and areas of business; hierarchic corporate structure assumes both indi-
 Country 
 Dimension Sweden Estonia Ukraine 
Power Distance (PDI) Low 
(31) 
Low 
(40) 
Low 
(22.8) 
Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV) 
Individualism 
(71) 
Individualism 
(60) 
Collectivism 
(31.5) 
Masculinity vs. Femininity (MAS) Femininity 
(5) 
Femininity 
(30) 
Femininity 
(-8.7) 
Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) 
Low 
(29) 
High 
(60) 
Low 
(4.8) 
Long-term Orientation (LTO) Short term 
(20) N/A 
Short term 
(4) 
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vidualistic decisions of executives and their sole responsibility for the results (Siegfried 
and Langer 2007). However, according to Pylypenko et al. (2012) Ukraine has a low 
power distance score of 22.8. Research suggests that the low score is determined by the 
fact that Ukrainians are reluctant to recognize and accept power due to historical 
conditions (Ukrainian land belonged to different states for a long period). These results 
confirmed previous studies by Mitry and Bradley (1999), where PDI for Ukraine was 
estimated to be around 23, but Spector et al.’s (2001) study showed a higher score of 
45, which suggested propensity to more hierarchic relations within organization.  
Sweden has a high IDV score (71) that describe Swedish culture as individualistic. 
Managers do not receive direct instructions, are free in their actions and judged 
according to their achievements. Relationships within an organization are contract-
based and for mutual advantage; promotion and hiring decisions are made solely on the 
base of merit. Estonia is also an individualistic country with quite high IDV index (60). 
Personal responsibilities and own achievements are highly valued among Estonians; 
managers are mostly task-oriented rather than relationship-oriented and relations serve 
functional purpose (geert-hofstede.com). Ukraine belongs to collectivist cultures, where 
feeling of “belonging to group” plays an important role. Personal relations, connections 
and network are more important than other professional characteristics. Managers 
associate themselves with the company and take all business results personally.  
All three countries have low MAS score that describes them as feminine societies. 
However, Estonia has relatively higher masculinity index (30), indicating higher pro-
pensity towards competition, achievements, and judging by success. Nevertheless, 
Estonia is a feminine country, where individuals do not ‘boast’ about their achievements 
rather they let results ‘speak for themselves’. Estonians are reluctant to raise problems 
and they tend to avoid conflicts.  In Sweden, very low masculinity score shows the 
importance of equity, compromise, and balance between work and life. Conflicts at 
work are resolved by compromise, negotiations and discussions. The extremely low 
MAS index in Ukraine might be caused by the important role of women in the history, 
religion and culture (Pylypenko et al. 2012). Feminine culture reflects in the importance 
of good relations and cooperation within an organization, as well as a relation-oriented 
management style. 
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Uncertainty avoidance shows propensity to accept uncertainty or attempt to manage and 
influence future; it reflects “the ability of society to overcome alarm and stress caused 
by uncertainty” (Pylypenko et al. 2012). Sweden has a low Uncertainty Avoidance 
Index (UAI), showing low preference to avoid uncertainty. Swedes have more relaxed 
attitude towards uncertainty, for them practice counts more than principles. 
Organizations are very opened towards innovations and deviation from norms is easily 
tolerated (geert-hofstede.com). Very low UAI in Ukraine reflects the tendency of being 
reluctant towards rules and procedures, inclination to take risks, and low resistance to 
changes. On the contrary, Estonia has high preference to avoid uncertainty, relying on 
rules, clear guidelines and work descriptions. Estonians are careful about taking risks 
and do not like ‘to rush’ into making decisions. Sweden and Ukraine are short-term 
oriented cultures, exhibiting respect for traditions, relatively small propensity to save 
and impatience for results. Pylypenko et al. (2012) stated that in the conditions of high 
political, social and economic instability in Ukraine there is a clearly defined tendency 
‘to live for the day’. LTO index has not been calculated for Estonia; however, lecturer 
Tõnis Saarts (Tallinn University 2009) names Estonia as a short-term oriented society, 
so one can assume that Estonia would have similar characteristics to Sweden and 
Ukraine within this dimension.  
The cross-country comparison has shown that despite different history, Sweden and 
Estonia have comparable economies and business conditions that encourage and secure 
business development, investments and entrepreneurship. Transparent and well-
established institutions, free access to financial resources and the rule of law decrease 
unsystematic risks for the companies. On the contrary, the unstable political, economic 
and social conditions in Ukraine, together with weak development of market 
institutions, unclear ‘rules of the game’, non-transparent juridical and fiscal institutions, 
weak protection of property rights, and laborious access to finance, all create difficult, 
unhealthy and risk-laden business environment.  
From the organizational culture point of view, Sweden is more liberal and open than 
Estonia and Ukraine. Flat structure, consensus, group decisions, equal rights, risk tole-
rance, openness towards innovations are the key notions that describe the Swedish cor-
porate culture peculiarities. Organizational culture in Estonia is diverse, both hierarchi-
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cal and democratic structures are widespread; however Estonians do not respect ‘posi-
tions’, but deeds and achievements. Management style is task-oriented, with respect for 
rules and procedures that provide feeling of confidence in the future. The role of suc-
cess, competiveness and self-fulfillment is relatively greater than in Sweden, although 
demonstration of superiority is also strictly unwelcome. Ukrainian corporate culture is 
clearly relations-oriented, where personal connections play an important role and being 
part of the group is essential. Being used to high uncertainty, Ukrainian managers are 
tolerant towards risk and used to having the responsibility for making decisions. 
 
2.2. Design of the study and respondents’ profile 
Several previous studies compared risk attitudes of managers in the USA, Canada, Asia 
and Europe; however, the current study is the first one to compare risk propensity of 
financial executives in European countries after the global financial crisis. There are 
only a limited number of studies targeting top-management of companies; most research 
on behavioral finance has been carried out among individual investors or students of 
economic specialization. It can be suggested that this study might give a start for further 
investigation in the field of risk-taking behavior of corporate managers, as well as 
exploring corporate strategy dependence on the risk attitudes of corporate executives.  
The present study was carried out from November 2011 to April 2012, using an online 
questionnaire. Altogether 125 questionnaires were sent and 58 answers were received. 
First, respondents received an introduction letter via Email, where the aim of research 
and type of questions were described shortly. The letter also contained a link to the 
online questionnaire. Questionnaires were prepared in English for Sweden, in Estonian 
for Estonia, and in Russian for Ukraine (Appendix 2). In order to ensure analogical 
perception of the questions, questionnaires were externally translated first from Russian 
into English and Estonian, and then translated back into Russian by third parties. 
Original and ‘derivative’ Russian questionnaires were compared and some small 
adjustments were made. All respondents had the option of completing the questionnaire 
anonymously if they did not want to reveal their name or name of the firm.  
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All respondents were selected through the author’s business contacts, Tartu University 
MBA students, Estonian Business School MBA, MBA executive students, Chalmers 
School of Entrepreneurship students and supervisors, Chalmers Business Incubator, as 
well as private HR and Audit agencies in Estonia and Ukraine. On the one hand it 
ensured a high return rate (46%) and quality of responses (all questionnaires were 
accepted for analysis); however on the other hand, distribution and numbers of 
respondents were limited. 
Questionnaire consisted of three sections. Respondents were asked to comment on their 
choices and on the questionnaire as a whole. Questionnaires were estimated to take 
around 30-40 minutes, but after receiving the pilot results, the estimated time was 
decreased to 20 minutes. It was found that respondents were not “counting right result”, 
but using intuition and “feeling of what is right”. However, questions were designed in 
a way that they did not have right or wrong answer; weighted outcomes of alternatives 
were equal.  
First section of the questionnaire contained general questions in order to receive the 
socio-demographic profile of the respondent and his or her company, including: city, 
gender, age, education, current position at work, general work experience and 
experience within current position, engagement with the company, main tasks and fields 
of work, total amount of employees, and the company’s turnover.  
The study was distributed among 58 top-managers of companies in Sweden, Estonia 
and Ukraine (Figure 2.5). 59% were male and 41% female, with an average age            
of 39 ± 9 years (Appendix 3). There were significantly more female respondents in 
Ukraine (70%), compared to Estonia and Sweden, where majority of respondents were 
male (79% and 73% respectively). 
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Figure 2.5. Total distribution of respondents among countries (absolute number) 
Majority of the respondents had completed higher education (Figure 2.6) and 66% of 
the respondents had higher education in the economic or financial field. Minimum work 
experience in the financial field was half a year (start-up companies), and maximum 
experience was 40 years, with a mode of 10 years and average experience of 12 ± 7 
years (Appendix 3). 
 
Figure 2.6. Profile of respondents – level of education 
Work positions occupied by the respondents can be divided into two major groups 
(Figure 2.7):  
Sweden 
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1. General and strategic management: CEOs, chairmen and members of the board, 
head of the projects, business developers and other managers; 
2. Financial managers: CFOs, chief accounts and controllers, deputies in economic 
and financial questions, etc. 
However, in small firms, CEOs were more likely to also fulfill the role of a CFO. 
Nearly all respondents stated that among their responsibilities include: managerial 
accounting, controlling, cost accounting, financial planning, budgeting, defining of 
business strategy, taxation optimization, etc.  
 
Figure 2.7. Profile of respondents – work positions 
The respondents had worked in their positions for 6.7 years on average; however, 
minimum experience in a position was half a year, and the maximum was 20 years, with 
a mode of 10 years. 
Position 
CEO 
Chairman (member) of the board 
Head of the project 
Business developer 
Entrepreneur 
Other management 
CFO 
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55% of respondents were employees that received regular salary, 17% of respondents 
owned shares of the companies they worked at and 28% were owners or co-owners of 
the companies they work at (Appendix 3). 
 
Figure 2.8. Profile of companies – Industry 
In Ukraine, 78% of respondents were employees and 17% were employees who owned 
shares of the company. In Estonia, 46% of respondents were owners and co-owners of 
companies and 13% were employees who had shares of the company. Around 42% of 
Estonian respondents were employees who received salaries. In Sweden ratios were 
accordingly 36%, 27% and 36%. 
Most of the firms where the respondents worked were engaged in services (37%) and in 
trade (25%), only 4% of companies represented financial industry. A lot of companies 
had not one, but several major fields of activity. 
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Figure 2.9.  Profile of companies – Company size 
It was not surprising that firm sizes were distributed unequally among countries, with 
majority of firms in Estonia being of micro and small size, and majority companies in 
Ukraine being large. Division by the size of the companies was made according to the 
European Commission norms.  
The second section was aimed to reveal some personal characteristics of the 
respondents and general differences in risk propensity in financial decisions. It was 
mostly dedicated to personal financial decisions. Questions described several situations 
where respondents had to make a choice between several opportunities, which involved 
different levels of risk. However risk levels were not given and respondents were 
expected to answer on the basis of experience and intuition. Several questions of this 
section aimed to compare attitude towards risk; for instance, respondents had to express 
their judgment on optimal capital structure of the firm in their industry. The respondents 
were also asked to estimate the probability of the financial crisis reoccurring in their 
countries; they could specify what actions they would undertake in order to reduce 
losses in case the financial crisis reoccurred.  
Section 2. Question 1. You have been invited to a charity evening, where an instant 
lottery is carried out. There are 1000 guests in total at the reception, and each of them 
has to buy at least 1 lottery ticket.  Everyone, however, is free to buy as many tickets as 
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they want, because there is no limit to ticket amount issued per person. All redeemed 
tickets with the owners' names will be placed into the lottery drum where 1 winning 
ticket will be randomly selected. Price of one ticket is 10 euro. Declared prize is 10 000 
euros.  How many tickets would you buy? 
This question was designed in order to compare relative propensity towards risk-taking, 
gambling and adventurism. The situation contains high uncertainty (it is nearly 
impossible to calculate outcome, because total amount of tickets bought is not 
revealed), chances to win are low, however spending (losing) money on charity, should 
not be perceived as regrettable loss. It is suggested that people who would by minimum 
amount of one ticket would be more risk-averse and less optimistic than those who buy 
a significantly higher amount of tickets.  
 
Table 2.3. Respondents’ decision on the amount of lottery tickets that (s)he would buy 
on charity evening 
 
  Total Sweden Estonia Ukraine 
Min 1 1 1 1 
Max 500 (50)* 10 10 500 
Average 14   (5)* 2.3 3.6 30 
St.Dev 67   (9)* 3 3.6 106   (13)* 
Mode 1 1 1 1 
* Result excluding extreme value of 500 tickets 
Source: Compiled by author 
The findings suggest that Ukrainian managers are more inclined to face uncertainty and 
rely on chance. Not only was the maximum amount of 500 tickets “bought” by 
Ukrainian managers, but also the average package of tickets was significantly higher, 
than in Estonia and Sweden. However the most widespread answer in all three countries 
(mode) is one. 
In the questionnaire respondents were asked to state whether they (or their family) have 
additional insurance apart from those that are compulsory in the country. In Estonia 
50% and in Ukraine around 48% of respondents had extra insurance, in Sweden 73% of 
respondents had extra insurance.  
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Section 2. Question 2. You have received 1.5 million euro inheritance (after taxes) from 
a distant relative. How would you distribute the money among different investment 
opportunities? 
In Question 2, the respondents were able to choose between 14 suggested investment 
opportunities and also between different sums of money: 0 2, 100 000 2, 250 000 2,   
500 000 2, 1 000 000 2. Total amount of investments must not exceed 1.5 mln. 2.  
 
Figure 2.10. Respondents’ preferred distribution (in %) of aggregated inheritance 
between different investment opportunities, cross-country comparison (Compiled by 
author)  
Choices within each country were aggregated in order to see the general country 
preferences towards offered investment alternatives (Table 2.4). The alternatives of 
investment in own company and in real estate were significantly more attractive for 
respondents in all countries (Figure 2.10). Ukrainian managers would invest 29,5% of 
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the aggregated inheritance into starting own company (or investing in existing one), 
Estonian managers have given 26% for this alternative, and Swedish managers 21%. 
20% of total wealth in Ukraine, 26% in Estonia and 9% in Sweden would be invested in 
real estate. U.S. Treasury bonds and U.S. banks were the least attractive options for 
investments among the three countries. 
 
Table 2.4. Ranking of respondents’ priorities to investment alternatives (1 denotes the 
highest priority, 12 – the lowest priority) 
 
Investment alternatives Sweden Estonia Ukraine 
Shares of large U.S. stock companies  10 7 5 
Shares of large stock companies in Europe 9 9 7 
Shares of stock companies in own country 5 7 11 
Shares of stock companies in BRIC 
countries 
2 8 11 
Government bonds of own country 3 11  - 
German Government bonds  10 10 9 
U.S. Treasury Bonds  10  - 12 
Deposit in the bank in own country 7 4 4 
Deposit in the Swiss bank  10 6 3 
Deposit in U.S. bank  10  - 10 
Real estate 6 1 2 
Investments in own company 1 2 1 
Cash, consumption 4 5 8 
Other 8 3 6 
Source: Compiled by author 
For Swedish managers the option of investing in BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) 
was a second priority (14%) after investing in own company (Table 2.4). These 
countries are among the most dynamically developing and growing countries with huge 
consumption markets, human and natural resources they have also been achieving 
outstanding results in the development of technologies. BRIC countries are strategic 
partners for Sweden, as Swedish companies can grow and expand only outside Sweden 
and the EU, as internal markets are overloaded. Swedish executives are ready to face 
higher risks for higher dividends in return. However, the third priority for Swedish 
executives is the Swedish government bonds. The Swedish government is stable and 
strong, therefore investments in its bonds would be considered to contain low risks. 
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Investments in real estate and own company were the main priority for Estonian 
managers that significantly stand out among all others. Next alternative – bank deposit – 
in Estonia gained only 8% of general wealth. Approximately same amount would also 
be invested in the U.S. (4.5%), Estonian (4.5%), BRIC (4,2%), and European (3.6%) 
shares. Estonian managers seemed to rely on their own abilities and achievements, and 
preferred to invest in themselves, saving extra-money for short-term purposes.  
Ukrainian managers prioritized investments in own company and alternatives that 
“save” money. Real estate has always been considered to be one of the most secure 
investments in Ukraine; that is why housing prices are extremely high in Ukraine and 
are comparable with highly developed European cities. It is also very hard to get and to 
then be able to pay back a real estate loan in Ukraine; that is why buying out real estate 
for the heritance money would be natural. Banks in Switzerland and in the country of 
residence took the third and fourth positions on the priority list (Table 2.4) of Ukrainian 
managers. Although the number of respondents that chose a Swiss bank and a Ukrainian 
bank was the same (12), Swiss banks gained significantly higher sums of money, 
thereby around 13% of common wealth would be invested in a Swiss bank, and 9% in a 
Ukrainian one. 30% of respondents, who chose bank deposit as a good investment 
alternative, distributed the money between both Swiss and Ukrainian banks. Managers 
in Ukraine do not want to invest own money in opportunities that contain risk; they 
prefer security and to “save for black day”, rather than to “put money to work”.  
Section 2. Question 3. In Your opinion, what is the optimal capital structure 
(Equity/Debt) in Your industry? 
Engaging in debt capital gives several advantages for the company: tax shield, risk 
diffusion, aggregating of significant amount of capital. However, using debt capital 
would not be beneficial if capital engagement is very difficult and expensive. There was 
a wide distribution in the answers of the respondents (Table 2.5); that is why it is 
difficult to make any conclusions. In order to get a more complete picture, individual 
answers should be compared with the company’s profile. On average, Swedish 
managers would prefer equal amounts of Equity and Debt in capital structure. It can be 
noticed that the mode of answers of Swedish managers was much lower than among 
Estonian and Ukrainian managers.  
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Table 2.5. Respondents’ judgment on optimal capital structure of the firm and on 
maximum period (years) until new venture starts accumulating profit 
Equity (%) Sweden Estonia Ukraine 
Min 20 10 10 
Max 100 100 100 
Average 50 52 63 
St.Dev 27 28 24 
Mode 20 70 50 
Years till 
break-even Sweden Estonia Ukraine 
Min 1 0.5 0.5 
Max 5 7 5 
Average 3 2 1.66 
St.Dev 1.2 1.4 1.3 
Mode 3 2 1 
Source: Compiled by author 
Estonian respondents preferred  52% of equity (48% of debt) on average, with a mode 
of 70%. Ukrainian managers on average showed preference towards larger amount of 
Equity (approximately 63%), but the mode among answers is 50%. This result might be 
caused by the fact that in Ukraine it is more difficult and expensive to receive debt 
financing; that is why financial executives tend to engage investment capital rather than 
debt.  
Section 2. Question 4. In Your opinion, what is the maximum period, during which a 
new promising business could declare losses, before starting to gain profit? 
The results show that Swedish executives are more patient than Estonian counterparts; 
they would accept approximately three years of non-profitable operating (Table 2.5). 
Among Ukrainian and Estonian managers the mode is 1 and 2 years. Ukrainian mana-
gers seem to be more focused on quick success than Swedish and Estonian managers.  
The current study set out to find out whether financial executives believe that financial 
crisis of 2008 could reoccur in 2012. A comparison of the results between countries 
would give the opportunity to understand whether managers are optimistic or 
pessimistic about the future. The results would also show general attitude towards 
economic situation in the country (Table 2.6). 
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Table 2.6. Respondents’ perception of possible financial crisis 
 
6. Do You believe that 
second wave of financial-
economic crisis will come in 
Your country (or has 
already reached it)? 
 
 
(% of respondents, who 
answered YES or NO) 
7. In Your opinion, what is the 
probability of recurrence of 
economic recession and 
financial crisis during next 
year (2012)? 
 
(Judgment (in average %) of 
respondents, who answered YES 
or NO in question 6) 
8. Do you undertake 
now any actions in the 
company to reduce 
losses (damage, risks) 
in case of recurrence of 
financial crisis? 
 
(% of respondents who 
answered YES or NO) 
 YES NO  YES NO  YES NO 
Ukraine 78 22 Ukraine 75 10 Ukraine 70 30 
Estonia 75 25 Estonia 56 25 Estonia 33 67 
Sweden 64 36 Sweden 50 50 Sweden 27 73 
Total 74 26 Total 66 19 Total 47 53 
Source: Compiled by author 
The results show that a majority of Ukrainian (78%) and Estonian (75%) managers 
believe that the financial-economic crisis would reoccur during 2012. Ukrainian 
managers estimate on average 75% probability that the crisis will occur during this year. 
Several respondents stated that Ukraine and Estonia had not fully recovered from the 
previous crisis, and that economic decline in 2012 would be a result of internal 
problems, rather than general world trends.  
The respondents in Ukraine confirmed that the economic conditions in Ukraine are very 
unstable and include various risks. 70% of respondents had undertaken various actions 
in order to reduce possible losses and risk in case of recurrence of the financial crisis. 
Although 75% of Estonian respondents believed that the crisis will come to Estonia, 
only 33% had taken actions to reduce possible risks and losses in the company. The 
executives in Estonia estimated lower probability of recurrence of the crisis to 56% on 
average. Those managers who answered ‘NO’ to the question about financial crisis, 
estimated probability of a crisis as around 10% on average in Ukraine and as 25% on 
average in Estonia (the results for Sweden are not discussed as only one respondent 
gave a numerical estimate of probability). Several Swedish executives suggested that a 
crisis might occur; but not in Sweden, as it has a very stable and strong economy. Thus 
managers in Sweden perceive the national economy to contain low risks.  
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The results from the first two sections suggest that Ukrainian and Estonian managers 
would not risk their own money and would prefer certain investment opportunities, such 
as real estate. This shows that they are more short-term oriented and less patient than 
Swedish managers. The executives in all three countries considered investment in own 
business to be the best option of money allocation, thus it can be assumed that all 
respondents have high level of self-confidence. In general, Ukrainian managers were the 
least optimistic about the future; on the contrary, Swedish managers were the most 
optimistic.  
The two dimensions of the Circular Model of Risk Propensity – Context and Personality 
have also been discussed. The current study focuses not on the personality of each 
individual, but on the general differences of the managers’ profile between the three 
countries. These are two dimensions that could not be influenced by the researcher, only 
results and make conclusions could be compared. The third dimension of the Circular 
Model of Risk Propensity – framing – is directly influenced by the researcher, thereby it 
is possible to test hypotheses that describe the different framing effects. That is why 
Framing is discussed separately in the next section. 
 
2.3. Testing of hypotheses and further discussion 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and Sullivan (1997), when a problem is 
positively framed (gains), decision-maker would avoid risks and take the variant “for 
sure”. On the contrary, when a problem is framed as “losses”, decision-maker would 
choose the risky alternative. 
It can be suggested that the general economic conditions and trends might affect the 
decision of economic agents and result in propensity to take risks. If a company was 
doing well in the past and the economic conditions in the country are favorable, 
managers may believe that best outcome would take place and took a risk in order to 
“win” more. In addition, in such conditions the worst result would not be perceived as 
dramatic. In contrast, in the condition of general economic decline, managers would 
exhibit risk-averse behavior, in order to minimize risks, and would prefer “sure loss” 
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(decline in value) over a risky alternative. These assumptions would be controlled on 
two different levels: 
1) Testing of 6 pairs of hypotheses, by introducing description of positive or 
negative economic conditions into problem framing; 
2) Comparison of questionnaire results between each country and comparison to an 
average result; whereby Ukraine represents general unfavorable economic con-
ditions and Estonia and Sweden represent conditions of stable economic growth. 
In order to test framing effect (narrow framing), the third part of the questionnaire had 
two alternative variants. Half of the respondents received Questionnaire A and another 
half Questionnaire B, where same problems were framed either as losses or gains. 
Problems in the third part were developed from the Kahneman and Tversky (1979), 
Moon (2001), Conlon and Garland (1993), and Sullivan (1997) experiments, but with 
several extensions, such as introducing additional problem framing – general economic 
conditions (high growth, neutral or crisis), past performance of the company (previous 
success or losses), and information about competitors.  
It was also decided not to use notions such as absolute losses, gains, profit, because in 
isolation from other financial data they do not show the right picture. Thus, in the 
current study business value is used as a reference point in estimating positive (increase 
in business value) and negative (decrease in business value) outcomes. It was suggested 
that the growth of business value should be the goal of major investment decisions of 
corporate executives.  
Sullivan’s (1997) problem from the experiment 1 has been taken as a reference point for 
the comparison with extended types of problems. Formulation of the problem was 
slightly changed, so that instead of gains and losses, the value of the firm was taken as a 
measurement of outcomes. Questionnaire B contained the problem, which was 
positively framed. 
Section 3. Problem 1.1.P. One expects that because of difficult economic conditions 
value of your company might decrease by 600 000 euro. You have two different ways 
out of the situation. If you choose option A, the company will definitely save 200 000 
euro of its value. For the option B you estimate that there is 1/3 probability to save 
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entire 600 000 euro of value, but there is also 2/3 probability of saving nothing out of 
expected reduction. Which option would you chose? 
Questionnaire A contained negatively framed analogue of the problem. 
Section 3. Problem 1.1.Y. One expects that because of difficult economic conditions 
value of your company might decrease by 600 000 euro. You have two different ways 
out of the situation. If you choose option A, the company will definitely lose 400 000 
euro of its value. For the option B you estimate that there is 1/3 probability not to lose 
in value, but there is also 2/3 probability to lose entire 600 000 euro of the business 
value. Which option would you chose? 
Expected outcome in each and every case is equal – 400 000 2 reduction of companies 
value (Table 2.6.1).  
 
Table 2.6.1 Problem statement 1.1. 
 
Problem 1.1.P. (positive framing) 
A B 
Value saved Probability Value saved Probability 
200 000 2 1 (100%) 600 000 2 1/3 
    0 2/3 
E(v) = (-600000) + 200000 = (-400000) E(v) = (-600000) + (600000!1/3 + 0!2/3) =  
=(-400000) 
Problem 1.1.Y. (negative framing) 
A B 
Value lost Probability Value lost Probability 
400 000 2 1 (100%) 0 1/3 
    600 000 2 2/3 
E(v) = (-400000)  E(v) = (-600000!2/3) = (-400000)  
Source: Compiled by author 
Consistently with the experiments of Sullivan (1997), the results show that when a 
situation is positively framed, majority of managers would choose the alternative “for 
sure” (62%). In the negatively framed situation results would be mirrored - 67% of 
managers chose risky alternative (Table 2.6.2). 
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Table 2.6.2. Results of the experiment 1.1. 
 
 Problem 1.1. P. Problem 1.1.Y. 
(%) A B A B 
Ukraine 64 36 25 75 
Estonia 55 45 46 54 
Sweden 75 25 29 71 
Total 62 38 33 67 
Source: Compiled by author 
First of all, these results show that managers perceive a decrease in business value as a 
clear “loss”. The results also show relative differences in risk propensity of Estonian 
and Ukrainian managers (because of a very small number of respondents in Sweden it is 
impossible to make well-grounded conclusions about risk propensity of Swedish mana-
gers; however, their answers are included in calculating of total result; and several 
assumptions can be made on the basis of the results received). Ukrainian managers are 
slightly more risk-averse than Estonian counterparts; on average 64% of Ukrainian 
managers chose the variant of saving 200 000 2 of the business value, rather than to 
taking the risk (36%) to experience 600 000 2 decline in the business value. Ratio for 
the Estonian managers is 55% to 45%. More significant differences are noticeable in the 
negatively framed situation, where managers had to choose between a certain value loss 
and a risky alternative. Ukrainian managers showed mirroring effect, with 75% choo-
sing variant B (risky alternative) and 25% choosing variant A. Estonian managers were 
not affected by the change in formulation of the problem significantly; only 9% showed 
preference for the risky alternative, resulting in ratio of 46% to 54% (Table 2.6.2). 
The next experiment included additional information in the statement of the problem – 
conditions of high economic growth and previous increase in business value. Problem 
1.2.1 P. appeared in Questionnaire B and it contained positive framing – opportunity of 
increasing of business value. The experiment aimed to test the following pair of 
hypotheses: 
! 
1
0
H : In the conditions of general economic growth and successful outcome history, 
managers would accept higher risks when faced with opportunity of additional 
increase of business value. 
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! 
1
1
H : In the conditions of general economic growth and successful outcome history, 
managers would not take risks when faced with opportunity of additional increase 
of business value. 
Section 3. Problem 1.2.1 P Due to general economic growth and well-chosen strategy, 
the value of your company in the current year has increased by 600 000 euros. 
Marketing department has developed two short-term projects for company development. 
You have analyzed these projects and concluded that project A guarantees 200 000 
euro growth of the company value; project B with 1/3 probability will give an 
opportunity to raise business value for 600 000 euros, or (with 2/3 probability) won’t 
affect value of the company. The company has free resources for the implementation of 
one project only. Which project would you suggest to implement? 
Questionnaire A contained the opposite Problem 1.2.1.Y that was negatively framed – 
probability of a decrease in business value. The experiment aimed to test the following 
pair of hypotheses: 
! 
2
0
H : In the conditions of general economic growth and successful outcome history, 
managers would accept risks when faced with danger of decline in business value. 
! 
2
1
H : In the conditions of general economic growth and successful outcome history, 
managers would not take risks when faced with danger of decline in business value. 
Section 3. Problem 1.2.1 Y: Due to general economic growth in the country, your 
company has already added 1M euro to its value, but 2 venture investments made in the 
past are not paying off. However, you still have an opportunity to abandon one of the 
projects. You assume that if you would continue with project A – company will 
definitely lose 200 000 euro of its value. On the other hand, project B with 2/3 
probability won’t affect business value at all, but with 1/3 probability it will lead to 
decreasing of company value for 600 000 euro. Which project would you prefer to 
continue? 
Taking into account previous performance of the company, expected value for all four 
alternatives is equal – 800 000 2 growth of business value (Table 2.7.1). 
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Table 2.7.1. Problem statement 1.2.1. 
 
Problem 1.2.1.P. (positive framing) 
A B 
Growth of value Probability Growth of value Probability 
200 000 2 1 (100%) 600 000 2 1/3 
    0 2/3 
E(v) = 600000 + 200000 = 800000 E(v) = 600000 + (600000!1/3 + 0!2/3) 
=800000 
Problem 1.2.1.Y. (negative framing) 
A B 
Decline in value Probability Decline in value Probability 
200 000 2 1 (100%) 0 2/2 
    600 000 2 1/3 
E(v) = 1M - 200000 = 800000 E(v) = 1M-(600000!1/3+ 0!2/3) = 800000  
Source: Compiled by author 
Introduction of the description of economic growth and successful previous outcome 
history into framing led to even more risk-averse behavior of the respondents. The 
results of the experiments show that 69% of managers chose certain variant (200 000 2 
business value growth) in the positively framed situation (Table 2.7.2). The most 
significant shift of preferences is noticeable among Ukrainian managers – from the ratio 
of 64/36 in neutral conditions to 82/20 ratio in the conditions of success. Swedish 
managers differ from both Estonian and Ukrainian counterparts in their preference; 50% 
of the respondents chose the risky alternative (B) in this problem. It would be 
interesting to obtain results from a larger number of Swedish managers in order to 
justify the results.  
 
Table 2.7.2. Results of experiment 1.2.1 
 
#1 #2 Problem 1.2.1.P  Problem 1.2.1. Y  
(%) A B A B 
Ukraine 82 20 25 75 
Estonia 64 36 46 54 
Sweden 50 50 43 57 
Total 69 31 36 63 
Source: Compiled by author 
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Therefore, 1
1
H  was accepted: In the conditions of general economic growth and 
successful outcome history, managers would not take risks when faced with opportunity 
of additional increase of business value. 
In the situation of decline of business value, 63% of managers chose the risky 
alternative. The answers of the Estonian and the Ukrainian managers were consistent 
with the previous experiment, so that the additional information about economic growth 
and previous growth in business value did not affect their decisions.  
2
0
H  was accepted: In the conditions of general economic growth and successful 
outcome history, managers would accept risks when faced with danger of decline in 
business value. 
The next experiment studied the influence of negative past performance and general 
weak economic conditions on the decisions of respondents.  
Section 3. Problem 1.2.2.P: It is financial and economic crisis in the country, your 
company has already lost 600 000 euro of its value. But in spite of this two venture 
investments made in the past are paying off. Unfortunately, you have resources for 
continuation of one project only. You have analyzed the projects and concluded that 
project A guarantees 200 000 euro growth of the company value; project B with 1/3 
probability will give an opportunity to return the value of the company to initial level 
(raise business value for 600 000 euro), but with 2/3 probability it won’t affect current 
value of the company. Which project would you prefer to continue? 
Problem 1.2.2.P (Questionnaire B) describes a situation when in general bad economic 
conditions a company has already lost part of its value, however several investment 
projects are profitable and can provide the opportunity to increase business value. 
Experiment aimed to test the following pair of hypotheses: 
! 
3
0
H : In the conditions of general economic crisis and previous decline of business 
value, managers would not accept risk when faced with opportunity of increasing of 
business value, but will choose certain alternative. 
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! 
3
1
H : In the conditions of general economic crisis and previous decline of business 
value, managers would accept risk when faced with opportunity of increasing of 
business value. 
Problem 1.2.2.Y in Questionnaire A described the same general economic situation, but 
it was negatively framed, so that the managers were facing a situation where their 
company had already lost part of its value and there is a danger of even stronger decline.  
Section 3. Problem 1.2.2.Y: It is financial and economic crisis in the country, your 
company has already lost 600 000 euro of its value. Two venture investments made in 
the past are not paying off as well. However, you still have an opportunity to abandon 
one of the projects. You assume that if you would continue with project A – company 
will definitely lose additional 200 000 euro of its value. On the other hand, project B 
with 2/3 probability will be break-even and won’t affect business value at all, but with 
1/3 probability it will lead to decreasing of company value for additional 600 000 euro. 
Which project would you prefer to continue? 
The experiment aimed to test the following pair of hypotheses:  
! 
4
0
H : In the conditions of general economic crisis and previous decline of business 
value, managers would not accept risk when faced with danger of even grater 
decline of business value, but will choose certain alternative. 
! 
4
1
H : In the conditions of general economic crisis and previous decline of business 
value, managers would accept risk when faced with danger of even grater decline of 
business value.  
In the problem 1.2.2.P the expected loss in business value for both variants A and B was 
400 000 2. In the problem 1.2.2.Y variant A and B had equal weighted outcome of       
800 000 2 decline in business value (Table 2.8.1).  
  
! 70 
 
Table 2.8.1. Problem statement 1.2.2. 
 
Problem 1.2.2. P. (positive framing) 
A B 
Growth of value Probability Growth of value Probability 
200 000 2 1 (100%) 600 000 2 1/3 
    0 2/3 
E(v) = (-600000) + 200000 = (-400000) E(v) = (-600000) + (600000!1/3 + 0!2/3) = 
=(-400000) 
Problem 1.2.2.Y. (negative framing) 
A B 
Decline in value Probability Decline in value Probability 
200 000 2 1 (100%) 0 2/2 
    600 000 2 1/3 
E(v) = (-600000) - 200000 = (-800000) E(v) = (-600000)-(600000!1/3+ 0!2/3) = 
= (-800000) 
Source: Compiled by author 
The results of the experiment 1.2.2 were very similar to the results of the previous 
experiment 1.2.1. 73% of all respondents chose the certain alternative when the problem 
was framed as growth of business value, and 69% chose the risky alternative when the 
problem was framed as a decline in business value.  
 
Table 2.8.2. Results of experiment 1.2.2. 
 
#3 #4 Problem 1.2.2.P (growth) Problem 1.2.2. Y (losses) 
(%) A B A B 
Ukraine 73 27 9 91 
Estonia 82 18 54 46 
Sweden 50 50 29 71 
Total 73 27 31 69 
Source: Compiled by author 
The results of the experiment 1.2.2 suggest that 3
0
H  and 4
1
H  should be accepted. 
However, on the country level, the results show a different picture. For Ukrainian mana-
gers information about poor economic conditions and poor previous performance in the 
past resulted in even higher propensity to take risk, but a majority of Estonian managers 
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chose the risk-averse action – additional decline in business value for sure. These results 
indicate the differences in risk-taking preferences of Ukrainian and Estonian managers 
in the conditions of an economic crisis, when a problem is framed as additional decline 
of business value. This difference might be explained through the profile of the 
Estonian and the Ukrainian respondents – Estonian managers came from micro and 
small firms, therefore losing additional 600 000 2 of business value would mean 
bankruptcy of their firm. On the contrary, a majority of the Ukrainian respondents 
worked in large firms (annual turnover around 43 mln 2) and that explains why they 
were ready to take that risk.   
The current study also investigates whether general economic conditions and 
information about competitors would influence the degree of “sunk costs” effect. For 
that purpose we use an extended and modified version of the Conlon and Garland’s 
(1993) experiments. Because of the limitations of current research the present study was 
not able to test both ‘project completion’ and ‘sunk cost’ effects, hence the study 
investigated the resource allocation decisions with 90% of project completion and 90% 
of the resource allocation rate. It is suggested that in the conditions of a financial crisis 
and a high level of competition, managers would terminate risky investment projects, in 
order to spend “free” money on acute financial needs. Problem 2.1.1.N (Questionnaire 
A) and Problem 2.1.2.K were aimed to test the following pair of hypotheses: 
! 
5
0
H : In the conditions of general economic crisis and high competition, managers 
would be more eager to terminate investment project than in neutral conditions. 
! 
5
1
H : In the conditions of general economic crisis and high competition, managers 
would not be more eager to terminate investment project than in neutral conditions. 
Problem 2.1.1.N didn’t include information about economic conditions, only 
information about company’s competitor and information about status of R&D project. 
Section 3. Problem 2.1.1.N: Several years ago, together with the owners of the company 
you decided to invest 3M euros in R and D project. The project was aimed to develop an 
innovative product, due to which your firm would be the first to enter a new market that 
would give you a significant competitive advantage. When you have already invested 
2.7M euro and the project was completed by 90%, you received information that your 
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company's competitor has already launched practically the same innovative product, 
but of much higher quality at a lower price. Management of the company is facing the 
choice: to continue R&D project and invest necessary 300 000 euros, or terminate the 
project. Which option would you advise as the CFO to the owners of the company? 
As a result, 68% of respondents decided to continue with the project. The difference 
between A and B alternatives for Ukrainian respondents was 10 % (55/45); that is much 
less than the average of 36% (68/32), thus Ukrainian managers were relatively more 
eager to terminate the project. 
Problem 2.1.2.K was extended with the information about a crisis in the banking system 
of the country, resulting in financial problems in the company ceteris paribus. 
Section 3. Problem 2.1.2.K: Several years ago, together with the owners of the company 
you decided to invest 3M euro in R and D project. The project was aimed to develop an 
innovative product, due to which your firm would be the first to enter a new market that 
would give you a significant competitive advantage. You have already invested 2.7M 
euro in the project. When it was completed by 90%, your company started experiencing 
serious financial problems, because of the crisis in the banking industry. Furthermore 
you received information that your company's competitor has already launched practi-
cally the same innovative product, but of much higher quality and better price. Manage-
ment of the company is facing the choice: to continue R&D project and invest necessary 
300 000 euros, or terminate the project and use the funds for acute financial needs of 
the company. Which option would you advise as the CFO to the owners of the 
company? 
 
Table. 2.9 Results of experiment 2.1. 
 
#5 Problem 2.1.1.N Problem 2.1.2.K 
(%) A B A B 
Ukraine 55 45 82 18 
Estonia 69 31 45 55 
Sweden 86 14 25 75 
Total 68 32 58 42 
Source: Compiled by author 
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The results from the three countries in total show a slight shift towards the alternative of 
terminating the project; however, there are significant differences between the 
countries. For Ukrainian managers information about financial problems in the country 
and in the company resulted in stronger preference towards continuing the project. On 
the contrary, significant majority of Swedish managers chose termination of the project 
and spent money on acute financial needs. Estonian managers showed slight preference 
towards termination of the project as well (55%). Therefore, a general conclusion 
cannot be made about the effect that poor economic conditions have over resource 
allocation decisions.  
Experiment 2.2 included problems similar to the previous ones, but it compared a 
situation of economic growth and good performance of the company with economy 
decline and very poor performance of the company. Managers had to state the minimum 
probability of success of the project that they would demand in order to make the 
decision to continue with that project. This experiment was aimed to compare risk pro-
pensity of respondents and to find out what risk levels would make them abandon 
project that is 90% complete. Problem 2.2.K and Problem 2.2.P were aimed to test the 
following hypotheses:!
! 
6
0
H  : Managers would demand higher probability of success of the project in order 
to allocate additional funds, when company is performing badly than when 
company’s performance is good. 
! 
6
1
H : Managers would demand higher probability of success of the project in order 
to allocate additional funds, when company is performing better than when 
company’s performance is bad. 
Section 3. Problem 2.2.K: Industry that your company works in is in very poor 
conditions. Your company is losing market share. Because of this, financial 
performance is decreasing rapidly, and you are foreseeing the continuation of this trend 
for at least several years. Last year aiming for consolidation of market positions, your 
company invested 2.7M euro in the development of entirely new product. The project 
has to be completed within six months after the inflow of additional 300 000 euro. 
However, you have recently received information that your competitor has already 
launched a similar product that has better quality at a lower price than yours. You 
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asked marketing department to conduct market research and find out whether 
consumers will be willing to buy your product in new conditions. For yourself, you have 
decided that .... 
1) You will make additional investments (300 000 euro) and continue the project if the 
probability that your product will be in demand is… 
2) You will terminate the project and won’t invest additional funds if the probability 
that your product won’t be in demand is ... 
The respondents could choose between 10% 25%, 50%, 75%, and 90% probabilities. 
They were informed that answers 1 and 2 should not be connected to each other. 
Problem 2.2.K was framed as a situation of very poor previous performance and it 
appeared in Questionnaire B. Questionnaire A contained the same problem, but with 
conditions of very successful past performance of the company. 
Section 3. Problem 2.2.P: Your company has gained significant market share and 
customer loyalty. Due to this, financial performance of the company is steadily 
growing, and you anticipate the continuation of this trend at least for several years. In 
order to consolidate market positions, last year your company invested 2.7 million 
euros in the development of entirely new product. The project was to be completed 
within six months after the inflow of additional 300 000 euro. However, you have 
recently received information that your competitor has already launched a similar 
product that has better quality at a lower price. You asked marketing department to 
conduct market research and find out whether consumers will be willing to buy your 
product in new conditions. For yourself, you have decided that .... 
1) You will make additional investments (300 000 euro) and continue the project if the 
probability that your product will be in demand is… 
2) You will terminate the project and won’t invest additional funds if the probability 
that your product won’t be in demand is ... 
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Table 2.10. Results of experiment 2.2. 
 
#6 Problem 2.2.K Problem 2.2. P 
(%) 
Invest, if 
probability 
of success 
is… 
Terminate, 
if 
probability 
of failure 
is… 
Invest, if 
probability 
of success 
is… 
Terminate, 
if 
probability 
of failure 
is… 
Ukraine 41 75 52 64 
Estonia 54 48 51 58 
Sweden 28 47 46 52 
Total 45 60 50 58 
Source: Compiled by author 
In this section analysis were made according to 54 answers, as 4 answers were not 
received. The results suggest that financial executives would continue with the project 
and invest remaining sum of money if the probability of success was 45% in the 
situation of economic decline and 50% in the situation of economic growth (Table 
2.10). 
Accumulated results from the three countries indicate that 6
1
H should be accepted. 
However, the result is not obvious and indicates only a slight difference in the 
preferences of the managers (Figure 2.11). 
 
Figure 2.11. Respondents’ resource allocation decision within different probabilities of 
project success and failure 
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A cross-country comparison would show a clearer picture. The results in Ukraine 
(Figure 2.12) show that hypothesis 6
1
H  should be accepted: Managers would demand 
higher probability of success of the project in order to allocate additional funds, when 
company is performing good compared with when company’s performance is bad. 
 
Figure 2.12. Respondents’ resource allocation decision within different probabilities of 
project success and failure (Ukraine) 
Ukrainian executives demanded 41% probability of success of the project in order to 
continue with the project in the condition of economic decline. In the conditions of the 
company’s growth Ukrainian managers would continue with the project if probability of 
success was 52%. It is also noticeable that in the conditions when the company is 
performing poorly, the probability of failure should be very high (75%) in order to take 
the decision to terminating the project.  
Results in Estonia differ significantly from Ukraine. In cases of both growth and decline 
Estonian executives demanded approximately 50% probability of success of the project 
(Figure 2.13). However, in the conditions of economic decline and poor performance of 
the company managers terminated the project that has 48% probability of failure, but in 
conditions of economic growth and successful performance, they terminated the project 
that had 58% probability of failure. 
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Figure 2.13. Respondents’ resource allocation decision within different probabilities of 
project success and failure (Estonia) 
The results of the current study were consistent with previous research and behavioral 
finance theory, but they revealed new results on the country level. The results suggest 
that Ukrainian managers were relatively more risk-averse than the Estonian and 
Swedish counterparts in the conditions of economic growth and successful performance 
of the company. At the same time Ukrainian managers showed much higher 
predisposition towards risk-taking when facing situation of economic crisis and decline 
of companies value.  
In the study specific features of Swedish managers could not be revealed due to a very 
low number of respondents (11), however some differences between Estonian and 
Ukrainian managers are still noticeable.  
The study results have several restrictions and caveats. Due to limited resources, only a 
small number of respondents took part in the study, which does not allow to apply many 
statistical tests that would strengthen the quantitative element.. The study did not take 
into account psychological characteristics of the respondents, as it was focused not on 
assessing risk propensity of individuals, but on comparing relative differences in 
propensity to take risk in the three countries. 
The current study discusses only a general profile of the respondents, thereby an 
interesting opportunity for further research lies in investigating the extent to which 
cultural differences determine risk propensity. The results obtained in this study might 
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be extended by introducing one additional dimension – the strength of decision-maker’s 
preference towards chosen alternatives. Given the framework and the questionnaire that 
were used in this study, one could estimate the strength of influence of such factors as 
culture, framing of the problem, and personal characteristics, on risk propensity. One of 
the areas for future study would be comparing risk propensity of financial executives 
with real performance of the company.  
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SUMMARY 
Behavioral finance science implies that economic agents do not behave according to the 
rational rules of economic theory, but according to their subjective, often irrational 
beliefs.  In the economic settings decision-makers usually face situations where they 
have to make predictions and estimations of the events that might occur in the future. 
As this type of decision-making contains a high level of uncertainty, one of the central 
concepts of behavioral finance is the concept of risk-taking behavior. The current study 
investigated risk-taking behavior and risk propensity of financial executives, assuming 
that one can find differences in risk propensity of managers in different countries.  For 
that purpose the first section discussed the theoretical concept, where risk propensity 
holds central role in the decision-making process. This concept suggests that the factors 
that determine risk-taking behavior should be examined by looking at close relation and 
interconnection.  
Building on the theoretical concepts and in accordance with the study objectives, this 
paper introduced a framework that outlines main determinants of risk propensity called 
The Circular Model of Risk Propensity. The model suggests that there are three main 
dimensions that should be taken into account when assessing risk propensity of 
economic agents: context, framing and personality.  
1) Context expresses wide framing of the problem.  Context includes four different 
levels:  country where research is taking place; problem scope; decision domain; and the 
decision- maker.  
This study investigated three different countries: Sweden, Estonia, and Ukraine; from 
different perspectives: general economic conditions, business environment, and 
organizational culture. 
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Cross-country comparison showed that the Ukrainian economy is associated with high 
risks, because of the unstable political, social and economic environment. Ukraine 
represents a country with transitional economy, where economic agents are used to 
operate in the conditions of high uncertainty. Estonian economy contains much less 
risks than the Ukrainian; however due to its openness it is highly dependent on external 
trends, thus economic agents are careful in accepting excessive risks. Swedish economy 
is the most developed and risk-resistant, because of strong government positions, high 
competitiveness of Swedish firms and significant financial resources. Swedish economy 
contains low risks, however majority of companies work for external markets and are 
dependent on general world trends.   
Swedish organizations are more liberal than Estonian and Ukrainian, with moderate 
control system and flat organizational structure, where decisions are taken within 
groups and responsibility is equally shared. Estonian managers are more task-oriented 
and focused on personal success, they act according to the rules and in that way reduce 
uncertainty. Ukrainian organizations are the most hierarchic, where top-managers have 
the decision power and responsibility in various fields.  
Risks might occur in different areas of life, and propensity to take or avoid risk would 
also depend on the problem itself.  The current study focuses only on the financial risks, 
that is why all questions in the questionnaire represent financial problems. Both 
personal and business domain decisions were included in order to compose a more 
complete profile of the respondents. 
2) Framing refers to the description of the problem that the decision-maker is faced 
with; it could be influenced and manipulated by the researcher. First Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), and then a lot of other authors, have shown that framing problem 
involving gains would result in risk-averse behavior of the decision-maker.  In this 
study it was decided to use the growth (decline) of business value when framing 
problem in a positive (negative) way.  
In this study six pairs of hypotheses involving different framing alternatives have been 
tested. The results have shown that framing affects the decisions made by managers in 
three countries with different strength.  
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In accordance with the research of Shapira (1997), MacGrimmon and Wehrung (1986), 
Bromiley (2001) it was decided to test how general economic situation and previous 
outcome history (performance) of the company would affect managerial decisions. The 
results have shown that when problem represents a situation of economic growth, has a 
good outcome history, and is positively framed, managers would be predisposed 
towards risk-averse choices to a greater extent than in a situation of neutral economic 
conditions.  Therefore, 1
1
H  was accepted: In the conditions of general economic growth 
and successful outcome history, managers would not take risks when faced with 
opportunity of additional increase of business value.  
However, among Swedish managers the results were different and they supported the 
suggestion that in good and stable economic conditions managers would be more 
willing to take risks. This finding has to be tested in further research as the number of 
Swedish respondents in the present study was not very high, which prevents making 
well-supported conclusions. 
In the conditions of ‘negative framing’ additional information about good economic 
conditions has not affected managerial decisions, thus results were consistent with 
general tendency to take risks in the situation of losses. That is why hypothesis 2
0
H  was 
accepted:  In the conditions of general economic growth and successful outcome 
history, managers would accept risks when faced with danger of decline in business 
value. 
In the situation of general economic crisis and negative outcome history managers 
exhibited risk-averse behavior, thus 3
0
H  was accepted: In the conditions of general 
economic crisis and previous decline of business value, managers would not accept risk 
when faced with opportunity of increasing of business value, but will choose certain 
alternative. 
However, results among Swedish managers were different; in the aforementioned 
conditions majority of respondents exhibited risk-taking behavior. However, due to the 
low number of respondents in Sweden, well-grounded conclusions cannot be made, thus 
this question is left open for further discussion.  
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Consistently with the studies of Shapira and March (1987), MacGrimmon and Wehrung 
(1986), the study results showed that majority of managers would exhibit risky behavior 
when their company fails. As a result, 4
1
H  was accepted: In the conditions of general 
economic crisis and previous decline of business value, managers would accept risk 
when faced with a danger of even greater decline of business value. 
At the same time, this hypothesis was not valid for the Estonian respondents. The 
results showed that in the conditions of economic crisis, where a company has already 
lost a significant part of its value, managers would avoid risky choices and would tend 
to make risk-averse decisions and losing certain amount of business value as a result. 
This difference might be explained by the profile of the Estonian respondents, as 
majority of the managers who work in micro and small firms perceive significant 
decline in business value as a threat of total bankruptcy, while for the Ukrainian 
managers in large firms the same is perceived as a “loss”.  
In the beginning it was suggested that economic conditions would influence the degree 
of the ‘sunk cost effect’. It was suggested that in the conditions of general economic 
crisis and high competition, managers would be more eager to terminate an 
unsuccessful investment project than they would in neutral conditions. This suggestion 
was supported by evidence from the Estonian and Swedish respondents and, 
consequently, hypothesis H0 was accepted for these countries. However, with the 
Ukrainian respondents an opposite result was found, and therefore H1 was accepted for 
this country. 
Results of the experiment 2.2 showed that 6
1
H should be accepted: Managers would 
demand higher probability of success of the project in order to allocate additional funds 
when the company is performing well than when the company’s performance is bad. 
Generally, the evidence showed that Ukrainian managers exhibit strong risk-taking 
behavior in dramatic conditions, and much more risk-averse behavior in favorable 
conditions (in comparison with the two other countries); changes in the preferences of 
the Estonian managers were much less significant. 
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3) Personality is a very complex category that might be explored from different 
perspectives: socio-demographic characteristics, personal qualities and preferences, 
previous experience, and inertia in handling standard situations. This study focused not 
on the characteristics of each respondent, but on the general aggregated profile of 
managers in the three countries. The responses to the questionnaire provided the 
opportunity to compile a picture of an average research participant. 
The average participant in Sweden would be a man with high education, who works as a 
CFO or a CEO in a medium or large company that provides services. He has general 
work experience of 11 years in the financial field. He has been working for around 4 
years in his current position, whether he owns some shares of the company or he is one 
of the owners. He has not only compulsory but also additional insurances and he does 
not believe in winning the lottery. Similarly to his equivalents in Estonia and Ukraine, 
the best investment opportunity for him is to invest in own company or to start a new 
business, thus he believes in his skills and fortune. He would also be more likely to 
invest in risky shares of BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) in order to get 
high dividends in the long run. A Swedish financial executive is more patient than, for 
instance, a Ukrainian one and s/he thinks that a new venture with good perspectives can 
declare losses in the first three years. This manager is confident in the strength of the 
national economy and estimates probability of the reoccurrence of financial crisis to be 
around 50%, however he believes that it will not affect Sweden significantly.   
Unlike the average respondent in Sweden, a Ukrainian manager would be a 38 years old 
woman with higher economic education, who works as an employee in a large company 
and receives only a salary.  She is more adventurous and would like to spend some 
money playing the lottery. She would also like to invest in own firm, but she would 
“save” money by investing in real estate or by transferring money to a Swiss bank.  A 
Ukrainian executive, similar to an Estonian one, would be more short-term oriented 
than a Swedish manager and would like ventures to be a quick success. A manager in 
Ukraine perceives the economic situation in Ukraine to be very unstable and unhealthy, 
therefore she predicts that the financial and economic crisis in Ukraine would reoccur in 
2012 with 75% probability. That explains why a manager would undertake special 
measures in the company to minimize probable losses.  
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The average Estonian respondent is a 40 years old male, who is an employee in a Small 
and Medium Enterprise (SME) in the trade and service industry. He would like to risk 
and buy a lottery ticket, but he will not spend a significant sum of money on such risky 
venture. Two best alternatives for investments would be own company and real estate; 
he would also save some money in a bank account. He believes that there is a high 
probability that the financial crisis might occur in Estonia again, both because of the 
external influence and the national economic problems.  
One can see that the general profiles of respondents are similar and comparable, 
however in each country there was a high variation in the answers. One of the 
possibilities for further study would be to investigate to what extent the cultural 
differences, framing and personal characteristics determine risk propensity of economic 
agent. The questionnaire that was developed for the purposes of the current study 
enables gathering all necessary data for comparison and estimation; however much 
higher numbers of respondents would be needed for this type of analysis.  
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EE 2004 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 425 14.9 34 .. 3 9 36.6 
EE 2005 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 425 14.9 34 .. 3 9 39.2 
EE 2006 .. .. 7 81 .. .. .. 51.1 .. 3 5 675 4 5 675 .. 425 14.9 34 .. 3 9 39 
EE 2007 .. .. 7 81 .. .. .. 49.9 .. 3 5 675 4 5 675 .. 425 14.9 34 .. 3 9 39.9 
EE 2008 .. .. 7 81 .. .. .. 49.2 .. 3 5 675 4 5 675 .. 425 14.9 34 .. 3 9 39.1 
EE 2009 .. .. 7 81 .. .. .. 48.6 .. 3 5 730 4 5 740 .. 425 14.9 34 .. 3 9 37.5 
EE 2010 .. .. 7 81 .. .. .. 49.1 .. 3 5 730 4 5 740 .. 425 22.3 35 .. 3 9 37.5 
EE 2011 18 42 7 81 .. .. .. 49.6 4 3 5 725 4 5 725 28 425 22.3 35 75 3 9 35.5 
EE 2012 24 51 8 85 8 39.4 11.2 58.6 3 3 5 725 4 5 725 29 425 22.3 35 72 3 9 36.9 
SE 2004 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 508 31.3 30 .. 2 9 81 
SE 2005 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 508 31.3 30 .. 2 9 72.3 
SE 2006 .. .. 4 122 .. .. .. 54.9 .. 3 8 561 3 6 619 .. 508 31.3 30 .. 2 9 74.9 
SE 2007 .. .. 4 122 .. .. .. 54.9 .. 3 8 561 3 6 619 .. 508 31.3 30 .. 2 9 75.7 
SE 2008 .. .. 4 122 .. .. .. 54.5 .. 3 8 561 3 6 619 .. 508 31.3 30 .. 2 9 74.7 
SE 2009 .. .. 4 122 .. .. .. 54.5 .. 3 8 697 3 6 735 .. 508 31.3 30 .. 2 9 75.1 
SE 2010 .. .. 4 122 .. .. .. 54.6 .. 3 8 697 3 6 735 .. 508 31.2 30 .. 2 9 75.1 
SE 2011 9 47 4 122 .. .. .. 52.8 7 3 8 697 3 6 735 52 508 31.2 30 18 2 9 77.3 
SE 2012 14 50 4 122 15.7 35.5 1.6 52.8 8 3 8 697 3 6 735 54 508 31.2 30 19 2 9 75.8 
UA 2004 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 354 41.5 30 .. 2.9 42 8.1 
UA 2005 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 354 41.5 30 .. 2.9 42 8.3 
UA 2006 .. .. 147 2,085 .. .. .. 57.3 .. 6 30 1,375 8 36 1,395 .. 354 41.5 30 .. 2.9 42 8.4 
UA 2007 .. .. 147 2,085 .. .. .. 57 .. 6 30 1,375 8 36 1,395 .. 354 41.5 30 .. 2.9 42 8.7 
UA 2008 .. .. 147 2,085 .. .. .. 56.6 .. 6 30 1,375 8 36 1,395 .. 354 41.5 30 .. 2.9 42 9.1 
UA 2009 .. .. 147 848 .. .. .. 57.2 .. 6 30 1,560 8 33 1,580 .. 354 41.5 30 .. 2.9 42 9.1 
UA 2010 .. .. 147 736 .. .. .. 57.2 .. 6 30 1,560 8 33 1,580 .. 345 41.5 30 .. 2.9 42 9.1 
UA 2011 149 181 135 657 .. .. .. 55.5 136 6 30 1,560 8 33 1,580 44 345 41.5 30 158 2.9 42 7.9 
UA 2012 152 181 135 657 12.2 43.3 1.6 57.1 140 6 30 1,865 8 33 2,155 44 343 41.5 30 156 2.9 42 8.9 
Source: Doing Business 2012 www.doingbusiness.org/                 
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Appendix 2.1. Questionnaire A and B (English) 
ENGLISH 
“Financial decision making by CFOs: International studies” 
Questionnaire A 
The questionnaire is anonymous. 
Approximate time for answering questions: 
 I  Section – 5 min. 
II  Section – 10-15 min. 
III Section – 15-30 min. 
  
Please, fill in the whole questionnaire at once (all 3 sections). It is very important, that You would answer all questions. 
After each Section there is a free text-box for Your comments, questions, propositions and ideas – we will appreciate Your input a lot! 
Thank You for Your time. 
First section (it is the same for A and B questionnaire) 
General information 
City 
Gender 
M 
F 
Age 
Education 
High school/ Professional school 
Higher education (Economics, Finance, Mathematics) 
Higher education (other) 
Other 
Current position at work 
How many years do You work on that position? 
Are You !n employee or business owner? 
Employee ( receive salary) 
Employee ( receive salary and own shares of the company ) 
Owner / Coowner of the company 
 
 
 
! "#!
Main tasks and fields of work 
(on Your current position) 
Total work experience in the Financial field 
(sum of years) 
What is the main field (industry) of the company You are working in? 
Finance (Banking, Insurance, Leasing etc) 
Trade (Sales, Commerce) 
Production (Manufacturing) 
Services 
Other 
Total amount of employees in Your company 
Company's turnover ceiling 
(per year, in euro) 
Second section (it is the same for A and B questionnaire) 
1) You have been invited to a charity evening, where an instant lottery is carried out. There are 1000 guests in total at the reception, and each of them has to buy at least 1 
lottery ticket.  Everyone, however, is free to buy as many tickets as they want, because there is no limit to ticket amount issued per person.  All redeemed tickets with the 
owners' names will be placed into the lottery drum where 1 winning ticket will be randomly selected. Price of one ticket is 10 euro. Declared prize – 10 000 euro.  How many 
tickets would you buy? 
(You have enough resources - money and credit card with you) 
2) You have received 1.5 million euro inheritance (after taxes) from a distant relative. How would you distribute the money among following investment opportunities? 
(If an option doesn’t attract you, please chose ! 0. Total amount in answers should not exceed 1.5 million euros) 
• Shares of large U.S. stock companies 
• Shares of large stock companies in Europe 
• Shares of stock companies in the country of residence 
• Shares of stock companies in BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) 
• Government bonds of the country of residence 
• Government bonds of the German Government 
• U.S. Treasury Bonds 
• Deposit in the bank in the country of residence 
• Deposit in the Swiss bank 
• Deposit in U.S. bank 
• Real estate 
• Investments in your firm or establishing of the own company 
• Cash (consumption) 
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3. In Your opinion, what is the optimal capital structure  (Equity/Dept) in Your industry? 
Please, write down the ratio. For example 10% to 90% 
4. In Your opinion, what is the maximum period, during which a new promising business could declare losses, before starting to gain profit? (years) 
5. Do You (or Your family) have any insurance, apart of compulsory insurance? 
Yes 
No 
6. Do You believe that second wave of financial-economical crisis will come in Your country (or has already reached it)? 
7. In Your opinion, what is the probability of recurrence of economic recession and financial crisis during next year? 
8. Do you undertake now any actions in the company to reduce losses (damage, risks) in case of recurrence of financial crisis? 
(If yes, please specify what kind of actions) 
Third section ( A questionnaire) 
This Section consists of the questions that imitate financial situations and decision making in the company. There are no “the right” answers for the questions, we would like to 
know which answer is the most acceptable (appropriate) for You as the CFO. Questions are not related to each other and appear randomly. 
  
1.     One expects that because of difficult economical conditions value of your company might decrease by 600 000 euro. You have two different ways out of the 
situation. If you choose option A, the company will definitely lose 400 000 euro of its value. For the option B you estimate that there is 1/3 probability not to lose in value, but 
there is also 2/3 probability to lose entire 600 000 euro of the business value.  Which option would you chose? 
|code 1.1.!.| 
A.    (Company will definitely lose 400 000 euro of its value). 
B.    (1/3 probability not to lose in value and 2/3 probability to lose entire 600 000 euro of the business value). 
2.     Your company has gained significant market share and customer loyalty. Due to this, financial performance of the company is steadily growing, and you anticipate 
the continuation of this trend at least for several years. In order to consolidate market positions, last year your company invested 2.7 million euros in the development of 
entirely new product. The project was to be completed within six months after the inflow of additional 300 000 euro. However, you have recently received information that 
your competitor has already launched a similar product that has better quality at a lower price. You asked marketing department to conduct market research and find out 
whether consumers will be willing to buy your product in new conditions. For yourself, you have decided that .... 
|code 2.2.P| Answers 1 and 2 should not be connected to each other. 
1) You will make additional investments (300 000 euro) and continue the project if the probability that your product will be in demand is… 
2) You will terminate the project and won’t invest additional funds if the probability that your product won’t be in demand is ... 
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3. It is financial and economic crisis in the country, your company has already lost 600 000 euro of its value. Two venture investments made in the past are not paying off as 
well. However, you still have an opportunity to abandon one of the projects. You assume, that if you would continue with project A – company will definitely lose additional 
200 000 euro of its value. On the other hand, project B with 2/3 probability will be break-even and won’t affect business value at all, but with 1/3 probability it will lead to 
decreasing of company value for additional 600 000 euro. Which project would you prefer to continue? 
|code 1.2.2. !| 
Continue with project A – company will definitely lose additional 200 000 euro of its value. 
  
Continue with project B - 2/3 probability that it won’t affect business value at all and 1/3 probability that it will lead to decreasing of company value for  additional 600 000 
euro.  
  
4. Several years ago, together with the owners of the company you decided to invest 3M euros in R and D project. The project was aimed to develop an innovative product, due 
to which your firm would be the first to enter a new market that would give you a significant competitive advantage. When you have already invested 2.7M euro and the project 
was completed by 90%, you received information that your company's competitor has already launched practically the same innovative product, but of much higher quality at a 
lower price. Management of the company is facing the choice: to continue RandD project and invest necessary 300 000 euros, or terminate the project. Which option would you 
as CFO advise the owners of the company? 
| code 2.1.1. H | 
A. To inflow necessary 300 000 euro in R and D project. 
B. To use the funds for other purposes and to terminate the project. 
5. Due to general economical growth in the country, your company has already added 1M euro to its value, but 2 venture investments made in the past are not paying off. 
However, you still have an opportunity to abandon one of the projects. You assume, that if you would continue with project A – company will definitely lose 200 000 euro of 
its value. On the other hand, project B with 2/3 probability won’t affect business value at all, but with 1/3 probability it will lead to decreasing of company value for 600 000 
euro.  Which project would you prefer to continue? 
| code 1.2.1. Y| 
Continue with project A – company will definitely lose 200 000 euro of its value. 
  
Continue with project B - 2/3 probability that it won’t affect business value at all and 1/3 probability that it will lead to decreasing of company value for 600 000 euro.  
Third section ( ! questionnaire) 
1. Due to general economic growth and well-chosen strategy, the value of your company in the current year has increased by 600 000 euros. Marketing department has 
developed two short-term projects for company development. You have analysed these projects and concluded, that project A guarantees 200 000 euro growth of the company 
value; project B with 1/3 probability will give an opportunity to raise business value for 600 000 euros, or (with 2/3 probability) won’t affect value of the company. The 
company has free resources for the implementation of one project only. Which project would you suggest to implement? 
|code 1.2.1. "| 
Project A that guarantees increasing of the firm value for 200 000 euros. 
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Project B that with 1/3 probability will give an opportunity to raise business value for 600 000 euros, or (with 2/3 probability) won’t affect value of the company at all.  
2. Several years ago, together with the owners of the company you decided to invest 3M euro in R and D project. The project was aimed to develop an innovative product, due 
to which your firm would be the first to enter a new market that would give you a significant competitive advantage. You have already invested 2.7M euro in the project. When 
it was completed by 90%, your company started experiencing serious financial problems, because of the crisis in the banking industry.  Furthermore you received information 
that your company's competitor has already launched practically the same innovative product, but of much higher quality and beter price. Management of the company is facing 
the choice: to continue RandD project and invest necessary 300 000 euros, or terminate the project and use the funds for acute financial needs of the company. Which option 
would you as CFO advise the owners of the company? 
|code 2.1.1.K| 
A. To inflow necessary 300 000 euros in R and D project. 
B. Terminate the project and use the funds for covering of acute financial needs. 
3. It is financial and economic crisis in the country, your company has already lost 600 000 euro of its value.  But inspite of this two venture investments made in the past are 
paying off. Unfortunately, you have resources for continuation of one project only. You have analysed the projects and concluded, that project A guarantees 200 000 euro 
growth of the company value; project B with 1/3 probability will give an opportunity to return the value of the company to initial level  (raise business value for 600 000 euro), 
but with 2/3 probability it won’t affect current value of the company. Which project would you prefer to continue? 
|code 1.2.2.!| 
Continue with project A that guarantees increasing of the firm value for 200 000 euro. 
Continue with project B that with 1/3 probability will give an opportunity to raise business value for 600 000 euro, or with 2/3 probability won’t affect current value of the 
company at all. 
4. Industry that your company works in is in very poor conditions. Your company is losing market share. Because of this, financial performance is decreasing rapidly, and you 
are foreseeing the continuation of this trend for at least several years.  Last year aiming for consolidation of market positions, your company invested 2.7M euro in the 
development of entirely new product. The project has to be completed within six months after the inflow of additional 300 000 euro. However, you have recently received 
information that your competitor has already launched a similar product that has better quality at a lower price than yours. You asked marketing department to conduct market 
research and find out whether consumers will be willing to buy your product in new conditions. For yourself, you have decided that .... 
|code 2.2.K| 
1) You will make additional investments (300 000 euro) and continue the project if the probability that your product will be in demand is… 
2) You will terminate the project and won’t invest additional funds if the probability that your product won’t be in demand is ... 
5. One expects that because of difficult economical conditions value of your company might decrease by 600 000 euro. You have two different ways out of the situation. If you 
choose option A, the company will definitely save 200 000 euro of its value. For the option B you estimate that there is 1/3 probability to save entire 600 000 euro of value, but 
there is also 2/3 probability of saving nothing out of expected reduction.  Which option would you chose? 
|code 1.1. !| 
A.    (Company will definitely save 200 000 euro of its value 
B. (1/3 probability to save entire 600 000 euro of value, and 2/3 probability of saving nothing out of expected reduction). ).                                     Appendix 2.1 continued 
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Appendix 2.2. Questionnaire A and B (Estonian) 
EESTI 
Finantsjuhtide otsustuse langetamise mehhanism 
Küsimustik A 
Küsimustik on anonüümne. 
  
Umbkaudne küsimustele vastamise aeg: 
Osa I - 5 min. 
Osa II - 10-15 min. 
Osa III - 15-30 min. 
  
Palun täitke küsimustik ühe korraga (kõik 3 osa). On väga oluline, et vastaksite kõigile küsimustele. 
Peale iga osa leiate koha, kuhu saate kirjutada oma kommentaarid, küsimused, ettepanekud ja ideed. Oleme teile tagasiside eest väga tänulikud. 
Täname teid vastamast! 
Küsimustiku esimene osa (on sama ankeedis A kui ka B) 
Üldinfo 
Linn 
Sugu 
M 
N 
Vanus 
Haridus 
Keskharidus, kutsekeskharidus 
Kõrgharidus (majandus, rahandus, matemaatika) 
Kõrgharidus (muu) 
Muu 
Praegune ametikoht 
Kui mitu aastat te sellel ametikohal töötate? 
Kas olete palgatöötaja või firmaomanik? 
Palgatöötaja 
Palgatöötaja, kui ka oman osa ettevõttes 
Omanik / Kaasomanik 
Peamised tööülesanded ja tegevusvaldkonnad (teie praegusel ametikohal) 
Töökogemus kokku rahandusvaldkonnas (aastates) ).                                                                                                                                                   Appendix 2.2 continued 
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Mis on teie ettevõtte peamine tegevusvaldkond? 
Rahandus (pangandus, kindlustus, liising jne) 
Kaubandus (müük) 
Tootmine 
Teenused 
Muu 
Teie ettevõtte töötajate arv 
Ettevõtte käibe suurus 
(aastas, eurodes) 
Küsimustiku teine osa (on sama ankeedis A kui ka B) 
Teid on kutsutud heategevuslikule tulundusõhtule, kus viiakse läbi kiirloterii. Vastuvõtul on ühtekokku 1000 külalist, kellest igaüks peab ostma vähemalt ühe loteriipileti, kuid 
kõigil on lubatud osta nii mitu piletit, kui nad soovivad, sest piletite arv pole piiratud. Kõik lunastatud piletid, millele märgitakse nende omanike nimed, pannakse loosirattasse, 
kust võetakse juhuslikult välja üks võidupilet. Ühe pileti hinnaks on 10 eurot. Väljakuulutatud auhinna väärtus on 10 000 eurot. Kui mitu piletit te ostaksite? 
(Teil on kaasas piisavalt vahendeid - raha ja krediitkaart) 
1) Olete saanud kaugelt sugulaselt päranduse, mille väärtuseks on 1,5 miljonit eurot (pärast makse). Kuidas jaotaksite oma raha järgmiste investeerimisvõimaluste vahel? 
(Kui mõni valikuvõimalus ei huvita teid üldse, valige 0 eurot. Vastuste summa ei tohi ületada 1,5 miljonit eurot) 
Suurte USA firmade aktsiad 
Suurte Euroopa firmade aktsiad 
Teie asukohamaa suurte firmade aktsiad 
BRIC riikide (Brasiilia, Venemaa, India, Hiina) suurte firmade aktsiad 
Teie asukohamaa valitsuse võlakirjad 
Saksa valitsuse võlakirjad 
USA riigikassa võlakirjad 
Hoiused teie asukohariigi pangas 
Hoiused !veitsi pangas 
Hoiused USA pangas 
Kinnisvara 
Investeeringud oma firmasse  või oma firma loomine 
Sularaha (tarbimine) 
Muu 
 
3. Milline on teie arvates optimaalne kapitalistruktuur (Omakapital/ Võõrkapital) teie valdkonna ettevõttes?  Kirjutage, palun, suhtena protsentides, näiteks 10% / 90% 
1. Milline on teie arvates maksimaalne ajaperiood, mille jooksul uus paljutõotav äri võiks kanda kahju, enne kui see hakkab teenima kasumit? (aastates) 
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5. Kas teil (või teie perekonnal) on lisaks kohustuslikule kindlustusele veel mingisugune kindlustus? 
Jah 
Ei 
6. Kas usute, et teie riiki tabab (või on juba tabanud) rahandus- ja majanduskriisi teine laine? 
7. Mis on teie arvates majanduslanguse ja rahanduskriisi kordumise võimalus järgmise aasta jooksul? 
8. Kas viite praegu ettevõttes läbi mingeid toiminguid, et võimaliku korduva rahanduskriisi korral kahjumit vähendada (kahju, riskid)? 
(Kui jah, täpsustage, milliseid toiminguid) 
Küsimustiku kolmas osa ( ankeet A ) 
See osa sisaldab küsimusi, mis jäljendavad rahandussituatsioonidega seotud otsustusprotsesse ettevõttes. "Õigeid" vastuseid pole, sooviksime lihtsalt teada, milline vastus on 
teie kui finantsjuhi meelest kõige sobilikum. Küsimused ei ole omavahel seotud ja esinevad juhuslikus järjekorras. 
1. Prognoositakse, et keerulise majandusolukorra tõttu väheneb teie ettevõtte väärtus 600 000 euro võrra. Teil on olukorra parandamiseks kaks võimalust. Kui teete 
valiku A, kaotab ettevõte kindlasti 400 000 eurot oma väärtusest. Valiku B korral on teil 1/3 tõenäosus ettevõtte väärtuses mitte kaotada, kuid samal ajal 2/3 tõenäosus kaotada 
kogu 600 000 eurot. Millise valiku teeksite? 
|kood 1.1.!.| 
A. (Firma kaotab kindlasti 400 000 eurot oma väärtusest). 
B. (1/3 tõenäosus ettevõtte väärtuses mitte kaotada, kuid samal ajal 2/3 tõenäosus kaotada kogu 600 000 eurot). 
2. Teie firma on võitnud märkimisväärse turuosa ja kliendilojaalsuse. Tänu sellele on ettevõtte rahandustulemused pidevas kasvus ning te eeldate selle trendi jätkumist 
vähemalt paari järgneva aasta jooksul. Turupositsiooni kindlustamiseks investeeris teie firma eelmisel aastal 2,7 miljonit eurot täiesti uue toote väljaarendamisse. Projekt 
pidanuks jõudma lõpule täiendava 300 000 euro investeerimise järel. Saite aga hiljuti informatsiooni, et teie ettevõtte konkurent on turule toonud sisuliselt sama toote, kuid 
seejuures kõrgema kvaliteediga ja madalama hinnaga. Palusite turundusosakonnal läbi viia turu-uuringu, et välja selgitada, kas tarbijad sooviksid osta teie toodet muutunud 
tingimustel. Teie ise olete otsustanud, et... 
|kood 2.2.P| Vastused 1 ja 2 ei ole teineteisega seotud. 
1) Teete täiendavaid investeeringuid (300 000 eurot) ja jätkate projektiga, kui teie toote vastu on nõudlus tõenäosusega... 
2) Katkestate projekti ning ei investeeri täiendavalt, kui  teie toote vastu pole nõudlust tõenäosusega 
  
3. Teie riigis on rahandus- ja majanduskriis ning teie ettevõte on juba kaotanud 600 000 eurot oma väärtusest. Minevikus tehtud kaks riskikapitaliinvesteeringut ei tasunud ära. 
Oletate, et kui jätkaksite projektiga A, siis kaotab ettevõte kindlasti veel 200 000 eurot oma väärtusest. Samas, projekt B oleks 2/3 tõenäosusega kasumi lävel ega mõjutaks 
ettevõtte väärtust üldse, kuid 1/3 tõenäosusega viiks see ettevõtte väärtuse kahanemiseni veel 600 000 euro võrra. 
|kood 1.2.2. !| 
Jätkate projektiga A - ettevõte kaotab kindlasti täiendavad 200 000 eurot oma väärtusest. 
Jätkate projektiga B - on 2/3 tõenäosus, et teie ettevõtte väärtust see ei muuda ning 1/3 tõenäosus, et see viib ettevõtte väärtuse kahanemiseni täiendava 600 000 euro võrra. 
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4. Mõned aastad tagasi otsustasite koos ettevõte omanikega, et investeerite 3 miljonit eurot TandA(teadus ja arendus) projekti. Projekti eesmärgiks oli välja töötada uuenduslik 
toode, mis oleks teie ettevõttel võimaldanud esimesena siseneda uuele turule, mis oleks andnud teile olulise konkurentsieelise. Kui olite investeerinud juba 2,7 miljonit eurot ja 
projekt oli 90% ulatuses lõpetatud, saite informatsiooni, et teie ettevõtte konkurent on turule toonud sisuliselt sama uuendusliku toote, kuid seejuures oluliselt kõrgema 
kvaliteediga ja madalama hinnaga. Ettevõtte juhtkond seisab silmitsi valikuga: kas jätkata TandA projektiga ning investeerida täiendavad 300 000 eurot või katkestada projekt. 
Millist valikut soovitaksite teie kui finantsjuht ettevõtte omanikele? 
| kood 2.1.1. H | 
A. Suunata TandA projekti lõpetamiseks vajalikud 300 000 eurot. 
B. Katkestada projekt ja kasutada 300 000 eurot teistel ärilistel eesmärkidel.  
5. Tänu üldisele majanduskasvule teie riigis on teie ettevõtte väärtus kasvanud juba 1 miljoni euro võrra, kuid kaks minevikus tehtud investeeringut ei tasunud ennast ära. Teil 
on veel võimalus üks neist projektidest hüljata. Oletate, et kui jätkate projektiga A, siis kaotab ettevõte kindlasti 200 000 eurot oma väärtusest. Samas on 2/3 tõenäosus, et 
projekt B ei mõjuta ettevõtte väärtust üldse, kuid 1/3 tõenäosus, et ettevõte kaotab 600 000 eurot oma väärtusest. Millise projektiga eelistaksite jätkata? 
| kood 1.2.1. Y| 
Jätkate projektiga A - firma kaotab kindlasti 200 000 eurot oma väärtusest. 
Jätkate projektiga B - 2/3 tõenäosus, et projekt B ei mõjuta ettevõtte väärtust üldse, kuid 1/3 tõenäosus, et ettevõte kaotab 600 000 eurot oma väärtusest. 
Küsimustiku kolmas osa ( ankeet ! ) 
1. Tänu üldisele majanduskasvule ja hästi valitud strateegiale on teie ettevõtte väärtus käesoleval aastal tõusnud 600 000 euro võrra. Turundusosakond on ettevõtte arenguks 
välja töötanud kaks lühiajalist projekti. Olete neid projekte analüüsinud ja jõudnud järeldusele, et projekt A garanteerib ettevõtte väärtuse tõusu 200 000 euro võrra; projekt B 
annab 1/3 tõenäosusega võimaluse ettevõtte väärtuse kasvuks 600 000 euro võrra või (2/3 tõenäosusega) ei osuta ettevõtte väärtusele mingit mõju. Ettevõttel on vabu vahendeid 
ainult ühe projekti elluviimiseks. Millist projekti soovitaksite ellu viia? 
|kood 1.2.1. !| 
Projekti A, mis garanteerib ettevõtte väärtuse tõusu 200 000 euro võrra. 
Projekti B, mis annab 1/3 tõenäosusega võimaluse ettevõtte väärtuse kasvuks 600 000 euro võrra või (2/3 tõenäosusega) ei osuta ettevõtte väärtusele mingit mõju. 
  
2. Mõned aastad tagasi otsustasite koos ettevõte omanikega, et investeerite 3 miljonit eurot TandA(teadus- ja arendustöö) projekti. Projekti eesmärgiks oli välja töötada 
uuenduslik toode, mis oleks teie ettevõttel võimaldanud esimesena siseneda uuele turule, mis oleks andnud teile olulise konkurentsieelise. Olete sellesse projekti investeerinud 
juba 2,7 miljonit eurot.  Kui projekt oli 90% ulatuses lõpetatud, tekkised teie ettevõttel pangandussektori kriisi tõttu tõsised finantsprobleemid. Lisaks saite informatsiooni, et 
teie ettevõtte konkurent on turule toonud sisuliselt sama uuendusliku toote, kuid seejuures oluliselt kõrgema kvaliteediga. Ettevõtte juhtkond seisab silmitsi valikuga: kas 
jätkata TandA projektiga ning investeerida täiendavad 300 000 eurot või katkestada projekt ning kasutada vabanevat raha ettevõtte kiirete rahaliste vajaduste katteks. Millist 
valikut soovitaksite teie kui finantsjuht ettevõtte omanikele? 
|kood 2.1.1.K| 
A. Suunata vajalikud 300 000 eurot TandA projekti. 
B. Projekti katkestada ja kasutada vabanevat raha kiirete rahaliste vajaduste katteks. ).                                                                                                Appendix 2.2 continued 
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3. Teie riigis on rahandus- ja majanduskriis ning teie ettevõte on juba kaotanud 600 000 eurot oma väärtusest. Vaatamata sellele, minevikus tehtud kaks 
riskikapitaliinvesteeringut toodavad ennast tagasi. Kahjuks on teil vahendeid ainult ühe projekti jätkamiseks. Olete projekte analüüsinud ja jõudnud järeldusele, et projekt A 
garanteerib ettevõtte väärtuse kasvu 200 000 euro võrra; projekt B annaks 1/3 tõenäosusega võimaluse viia ettevõtte väärtus algtasemele ehk kasvatada ettevõtte väärtust 600 
000 euro võrra, kuid 2/3 tõenäosusega ei mõjutaks see ettevõtte praegust väärtust. Millist projekti eelistaksite? 
|kood 1.2.2.!| 
Jätkate projektiga A, mis garanteerib ettevõtte väärtuse kasvu 200 000 euro võrra. 
Jätkate projektiga B, mis annaks 1/3 tõenäosusega võimaluse tõsta ettevõtte väärtust 600 000 euro võrra, kuid 2/3 tõenäosusega ei mõjutaks see ettevõtte praegust väärtust.  
  
4. Valdkond, milles teie ettevõtte tegutseb, on viletsas seisukorras. Teie ettevõte kaotab turuosa. Seetõttu väheneb kasum väga kiiresti ning te prognoosite selle trendi jätkumist 
vähemalt paari järgmise aasta jooksul. Eelmisel aastal investeeris teie ettevõtte turupositsiooni hoidmise eesmärgil 2,7 miljonit eurot täiesti uue toote väljatöötamisse. Projekt 
tuleks lõpetada järgmise 6 kuu jooksul ning sinna tuleb suunata veel investeeringuid 300 000 euro ulatuses. Saite aga hiljuti informatsiooni, et teie ettevõtte konkurent on turule 
toonud sisuliselt sama toote, kuid seejuures kõrgema kvaliteediga ja madalama hinnaga. Palusite turundusosakonnal läbi viia turu-uuringu, et välja selgitada, kas tarbijad 
sooviksid osta teie toodet muutunud tingimustel. Teie ise olete otsustanud, et... 
|kood 2.2.K| 
1) Teete täiendavaid investeeringuid (300 000 eurot) ja jätkate projektiga, kui tõenäosus on ..., et teie toote vastu on nõudlus. 
2) Katkestate projekti ning ei investeeri täiendavalt, kui tõenäosus on ..., et teie toote vastu pole nõudlust. 
5. Prognoositakse, et keerulise majandusolukorra tõttu võib teie ettevõtte väärtus väheneda 600 000 euro võrra. Teil on olukorra parandamiseks kaks võimalust. Kui 
teete valiku A, säilitab ettevõte kindlasti 200 000 eurot oma väärtusest. Valiku B korral on teil 1/3 tõenäosus säilitada kogu 600 000 eurot, kuid samal ajal ka 2/3 tõenäosus et te 
ei säilita ettevõtte väärtust prognoositavast langusest. Millise valiku teeksite? 
|kood 1.1.!| 
A. (Ettevõte säästab kindlasti 200 000 eurot oma väärtusest). 
B. (1/3 tõenäosus, et ettevõte säilitab 600 000 eurot oma väärtusest, kuid samal ajal ka 2/3 tõenäosus, et te ei säilita ettevõtte väärtust prognoositavast langusest). 
  
 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dDdVNFlqLVlfOFRCSkRBVUlOcEZ6SEE6MA 
 https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/viewform?formkey=dGJ2VVdjYVBCNG1mcERqNnk1N3plVVE6MA 
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Appendix 2.3. Questionnaire A and B (Russian) 
 
!"##$%& 
"!""#$%&'()*$ +$,()*-+( ./*)01*0 /$2$)*3 4*)()"&'5+* +$)$%6$/(+*" 7)8$1( 7 
7)8$1*/&'()*$ ./&'&%*1"0 ()&)*+)&. 
  
9/*$)1*/&'&:)&$ '/$+0 -(.&#)$)*0: 
;#&8 I - 5 +*). 
;#&8 II - 10-15 +*). 
;#&8 III - 15-30 +*). 
  
<&6(#=3"1(, -(.&#)*1$ '"> ()8$1= ('"$ 3 ?#&8() -( 1 /(-. 9:$)@ '(6)&, :1&?5 '"$ .&#0 ?5#* -(.&#)$)5. 
<&"#$ 8(6%&A& ?#&8( B5 +&6$1$ &"1('*1@ "'&* 8&++$)1(/**, '&./&"5, *%$*. C(+ *)1$/$")& B(2$ +)$)*$! 
D.("*?& -( '(2$ '/$+0! 
'()*+, -./0 (/12340/*+( */5)/6+ 1.7 /-(28 430(9 : 2 ;) 
9?E(0 *)4&/+(F*0 
G&/&% 
<&#  
H 
I 
B&-/("1 
<-)4=/*432( 
D/$%)$$, "/$%)$$ ".$F*(#@)&$ 
B5"2$$ (J8&)&+*:$"8&$, 4*)()"&'&$, +(1$+(1*:$"8&$) 
B5"2$$ (%/=A&$) 
K/=A&$ 
L$8=E(0 %&#6)&"1@ )( ./$%./*01**? 
M(8 %&#A& '5 /(?&1($1$ )( J1&3 %&#6)&"1* ? (#$1) 
N'#0$1$"@ #* '5 )($+)5+ /(?&1)*8&+ *#* "&'#(%$#@F$+ 4*/+5? 
C(O+)53 /(?&1)*8 (.&#=:(> -(/(?&1)=> .#(1=) 
C(O+)53 /(?&1)*8 (.&#=:(> -(/(?&1)> .#(1= * *+$> %&#> ' ./$%./*01**) 
B#(%$#$F 4*/+5/ D&'#(%$#$F 4*/+5 
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!"#" $%&$'&"( %)*+" ,*(-*./&$%-0 0 1","20 
(&" 1"&03"*3$4 ,$.5&$%-0) 
67804 $9:- +"7$-: ' %)*+* )0&"&%$' (%;33" .*-) 
<       ! "#"$% $&'$()* + $(,$+,$- '#.$&#/& +#0# "$-1#,*2? 
o   =0&"&%$'"( (7"&>$'%>"(, %-+"?$'"(, .010&@$'"() 
o   A$+@$'.( 
o   B+$01'$,%-'$ 
o   C%.;@0 
o   D+;@"(  
678** >$.02*%-'$ %$-+;,&0>$' ' '"#*4 >$39"&00 
E$,$'$4 '".$':4 $7$+$- '"#*4 >$39"&00 
!&$'$% .)$" ($3*,#"$+4/ +$1'$(4 3)2 $./*5 #,"/& 6 * 7) 
1. !: 9+0@."#*&: &" 7."@$-'$+0-*./&:4 9+0*3, &" >$-$+$3 9+$'$,(- 3$3*&-"./&;F .$-*+*F. G" 9+0*3* 1000 @$%-*4. H"5,:4 01 @$%-*4 ,$.5*& >;90-/ 30&03;3 
1 70.*-, &$ ;2"%-&0>0 3$@;- 9+0$7+*%-0 0 .F7$* ,+;@$* >$.02*%-'$, -"> >"> >$.02*%-'$ ':9;%>"*3:? 70.*-$' &* $@+"&02*&$. !%* >;9.*&&:* 70.*-: % 03*&"30 
'.",*./I*' 7;,;- $9;8*&: ' 7"+"7"&, 01 >$-$+$@$ %.;2"4&:3 $7+"1$3 ,$%-"&;- $,0& ':0@+:#&:4 70.*-. J-$03$%-/ $,&$@$ 70.*-" 10 *'+$. 67K('.*&&"( %;33" 
':0@+:#" – 10 000 *'+$.  J>$./>$ 70.*-$' ': 7: >;90.0? (B+0 ;2*-*, 2-$ ; '"% % %$7$4 *%-/ ,$%-"-$2&$ %+*,%-' – &".02&:*, >+*,0-&"( >"+-$2>" 0 -.9) 
2. !: 9$.;20.0 ' &"%.*,%-'$ $- %'$*@$ ,"./&*@$ +$,%-'*&&0>" 1 500 000 *'+$ (1" ':2*-$3 &".$@$'). H"> 7: ': +"%9+*,*.0.0 9$.;2*&&:* ,*&/@0 3*5,; 
%.*,;F8030 '$13$5&$%-(30 '.$5*&04? 
(L%.0 '"+0"&- '"% &* 9+0'.*>"*-, 9$%-"'/-*, 9$5".;4%-", 0 *'+$. ! %;33*, $-'*-: &* ,$.5&: 9+*':#"-/ 1.5 3.&. *'+$) 
<       M>I00 >+;9&:? 70+5*':? >$39"&04 JNM  
<       M>I00 >+;9&:? 70+5*':? >$39"&04 L'+$9:  
<       M>I00 70+5*':? >$39"&04 %-+"&: 9+$50'"&0( 
<       M>I00 70+5*':? >$39"&04 %-+"& OPQH 
<       E$%;,"+%-'*&&:* $7.0@"I00 %-+"&: 9+$50'"&0( 
<       E$%;,"+%-'*&&:* $7.0@"I00 9+"'0-*./%-'" E*+3"&00 
<       67.0@"I00 H"1&"2*4%-'" JNM 
<       D*9$10- 7"&>" %-+"&: 9+$50'"&0( 
<       D*9$10- ' N'*4I"+%>$3 7"&>* 
<       D*9$10- ' 7"&>* JNM 
<       G*,'0503$%-/ (;-$2&0-* ' >">$4 %-+"&*, *%.0 ; '"% *%-/ 9+*,9$2-*&0() ______________________ 
<       !.$5*&0( ' %'$F )0+3; 0.0 $->+:-0* &$'$4 %$7%-'*&&$4 )0+3: 
<       G".02&:* (&"9+"'0./" 7: ' 9$-+*7.*&0*) 
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3. !" #$%&'( ')&)*+, ,$,"#$ "-.*'$/0)$1 2.3(,.(3$ ,$-*.$/$ (4"52.#&))67 ,$-*.$// 8$&')67 ,$-*.$/), 9/1 :*3'6 *; #$%&7 ".3$2/*? 
!"2.$#0.&, -"<$/(72.$, -3"=&).)"& 2"".)"%&)*&, )$-3*'&3 10% , 90%. 
4. >$,"# '$,2*'$/0)67 -&3*"9, # .&?&)*& ,"."3"@" )"#67 -&32-&,.*#)67 5*;)&2 '"<&. 3$5".$.0 # (56.",, -&3&9 .&' ,$, )$?$.0 -3*)"2*.0 -3*56/0, #6 2?*.$&.& 
-3*&'/&'6'? (/&.) 
5. A2.0 /* ( #$2 (#$%&7 2&'0*) ,$,*&-/*5" 2.3$B"#6& -"/*26, ,3"'& "51;$.&/0)6B? 
C$ 
D&. 
6. 4?*.$&.& /* #6, ?." 2.3$)( )$,3"&. (*/* (<& )$,36/$) #."3$1 #"/)$ :*)$)2"#"-E,")"'*?&2,"@" ,3*;*2$? 
7. 4 ,$,"7 #&3"1.)"2.0+ #6 "=&)*#$&.& )$2.(-/&)*& ,3*;*2$ # 5/*<$7%*7 @"9? 
8. !3&9-3*)*'$&.& /* #6 ,$,*&-/*5" '&36 )$ -3&9-3*1.**, ?."56 2)*;*.0 -".&3* ((56.,*, 3*2,*) # 2/(?$& )$2.(-/&)*1 :*)$)2"#"@" ,3*;*2$? 
(A2/* CF, ." (."?)*.&, -"<$/(72.$, ,$,*&) 
!"#$%& '()* ( +,*#$+ - ) 
G/", 2"2."*. *; #"-3"2"#, ,"."36& '"9&/*3(+. -3*)1.*& :*)$)2"#6B 3&%&)*7 )$ -3&9-3*1.**. D$ E.* #"-3"26 )&. &9*)"@" -3$#*/0)"@" ".#&.$, )$' #$<)" 
(;)$.0, ,$,*& #$3*$).6 )$*5"/&& -3*&'/&'6 *'&))" 9/1 #$2 ,$, :*)$)2"#"@" '&)&9<&3$. H"-3"26 )& 2#1;$)6 '&<9( 2"5"7 * -3&92.$#/&)6 # $),&.& # 2/(?$7)"' 
-"319,&.  
  
1. I<*9$&.21, ?." *;-;$ 2/"<)6B E,")"'*?&2,*B (2/"#*7 #$%$ :*3'$ -".&31&. 600 000 &#3" 2#"&7 2."*'"2.*. J #$2 &2.0 2 #";'"<)"2.* #6B"9$ *; 2/"<*#%&721 
2*.($=**. H65*3$1 #$3*$). F – :*3'$ )$#&3)1,$ -".&31&. 400 000 &#3" 2#"&7 2."*'"2.*. H$3*$). G 2 #&3"1.)"2.0+ 1\3 9$2. #";'"<)"2.0 2"B3$)*.0 -"/)(+ 
2."*'"2.0 ,"'-$)**, )" 2 #&3"1.)"2.0+ 2\3 - 2."*'"2.0 ,"'-$)** #2K-.$,* 2)*;*.21 )$ 600 000 &#3". >$,"7 *; #$3*$)."# #6 #65&3&.&? 
|,"9 #"-3"2$ 1.1.J.| 
F. (>"'-$)*1 )$#&3)1,$ -".&31&. # 2."*'"2.* 400 000 &#3") 
G. (4 #&3"1.)"2.0+ 1\3 ,"'-$)*1 )& -".&31&. # 2."*'"2.*, )" 2 #&3"1.)"2.0+ 2\3 -".&31&. 600 000 &#3" 2."*'"2.*) 
2. H$%& -3&9-3*1.*& ;$#"&#$/" ;)$?*.&/0)(+ 9"/+ 36),$, $ .$,<& /"1/0)"2.0 ,/*&)."#. G/$@"9$31 E."'(, :*)$)2"#6& -",$;$.&/* -3&9-3*1.*1 2.$5*/0)" 3$2.(., 
* #6 -3&9#*9*.& -3"9"/<&)*& 9$))"7 .&)9&)=**, ,$, '*)*'(' )$ )&2,"/0," /&.. 4 =&/0+ ;$,3&-/&)*1 -";*=*7 )$ 36),& # -3"%/"' @"9( #$%$ :*3'$ #/"<*/$ 2 
700 000 &#3" # 3$;3$5".,( 2"#&3%&))" )"#"@" -3"9(,.$. !3"&,. 9"/<&) 56/ 56.0 ;$#&3%&) ?&3&; -"/@"9$ -"2/& #/*#$)*1 9"-"/)*.&/0)6B 300 000 &#3". I9)$,", 
)&9$#)" , #$' -"2.(-*/$ *):"3'$=*1, ?." :*3'$-,"),(3&). (<& #6-(2.*/$ )$ 36)", $)$/"@*?)67 -3"9(,., ,"."367 "5/$9$&. 5"/&& #62",*' ,$?&2.#"' -3* 5"/&& 
)*;,"7 =&)&, ?&' #$%. H6 -"3(?*/* '$3,&.*)@"#"'( ".9&/( -3"#&2.* *22/&9"#$)*& 36),$, ?."56 (;)$.0, 5(9(. /* -".3&5*.&/* -",(-$.0 #$% -3"9(,. # )"#6B 
(2/"#*1B. F 9/1 2&51, #6 3&%*/*, ?."…. 
|2.2. P| 
I.#&.6 1 * 2 )& 9"/<)6 56.0 2#1;$)6 '&<9( 2"5"7. 
1)    H6 5(9&.& #,/$96#$.0 9"-"/)*.&/0)6& *)#&2.*=** (300 000 &#3") * -3"9"/<$.0 -3"&,., &2/* #&3"1.)"2.0 ."@", ?." #$% -3"9(,. 5(9(. -",(-$.0, 
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2)    !" #$%&'#()%* +,#*-% ) '* ./0*%* (-1&0"(&%2 $,*0$%(&, *$1) (*,#3%'#$%2 %#4#, 5%# (&6 +,#0/-% $#(*,6*''# '* ./0*% +#127#(&%2$3 $+,#$#8, $#$%&()%… 
 
  
3. ! $%,&'* 9)'&'$#(#-:-#'#8)5*$-); -,)7)$, $%#)8#$%2 (&6*; -#8+&')) /<* /+&1& '& 600 000 *(,#. !*'5/,'"* )'(*$%)=)) ( 2 +,#*-%&, $0*1&''"* ( +,#61#8, 
%&-<* '* #+,&(0&1) $*.3, #0'&-# / (&$ ($* *>* *$%2 (#78#<'#$%2 #%-&7&%2$3 #% #0'#4# +,#*-%&. !" +,*0+#1&4&*%*, 5%# *$1) #$%&()%2 +,#*-% ?, #' %#5'# +,)(*0*% - 
0&12'*;6*8/ $')<*')@ $%#)8#$%) 9),8" ( ,&78*,* 200 000 *(,#. A 0,/4#; $%#,#'", +,#*-% B $ (*,#3%'#$%2@ 2/3 #-&<*%$3 .*7/."%#5'"8 ) ')-&- '* +#(1)3*% '& 
$%#)8#$%2 -#8+&')), '# $ (*,#3%'#$%2 1\3 8#<*% +,)(*$%) - $')<*')@ $%#)8#$%) -#8+&')) *>* '& 600 000 *(,#. C&-#; +,#*-% (" +,*0+#5%*%* #$%&()%2? 
|-#0 (#+,#$& 1.2.2. D| 
E$%&()%2 +,#*-% ?, -#%#,"; %#5'# $')7)% $%#)8#$%2 -#8+&')) '& 200 000 *(,#. 
  
E$%&()%2 +,#*-% B, -#%#,"; $ (*,#3%'#$%2@ 2\3 ')-&- '* +#(1)3*% '& $%#)8#$%2 -#8+&')), '# $ (*,#3%'#$%2@ 1\3 8#<*% +,)(*$%) - $')<*')@ $%#)8#$%) 
-#8+&')) *>* '& 600 000 *(,#. 
  
4. F*$-#12-# 1*% '&7&0 $#(8*$%'# $ (1&0*12=&8) +,*0+,)3%)3 (" ,*6)1) (1#<)%2 3 81'. *(,# ( RandD +,#*-% ()$$1*0#(&')3 ) ,&7,&.#%-)). G,#*-% 7&-1@5&1$3 ( 
,&7,&.#%-* )''#(&=)#''#4# +,#0/-%&, .1&4#0&,3 -#%#,#8/ (&6& 9),8& 8#41& +*,(#; (";%) '& '#("; ,"'#-, 5%# 0&1# ." (&8 7'&5)%*12'"* -#'-/,*'%'"* 
+,*)8/>*$%(&. C#40& (" /<* (1#<)1) 2.7 81'. *(,#, & +,#*-% ."1 7&(*,6*' '& 90%, (" /7'&1), 5%# -#8+&')3--#'-/,*'% /$+*1& +*,(#; 7&+/$%)%2 ( +,#0&</ 
+,&-%)5*$-) &'&1#4)5'"; )''#(&=)#''"; +,#0/-%, '# 4#,&70# ("$6*4# -&5*$%(& +,) .#1** ')7-#; =*'*. H/-#(#0$%(# 9),8" #-&7&1#$2 +*,*0 (".#,#8: 
+,#0#1<&%2 )$$1*0#(&%*12$-); +,#*-% ) (1#<)%2 ( '*4# '*#.I#0)8"* 300 000 *(,# )1) <* 7&-,"%2 +,#*-%. C&-#; (&,)&'% (" -&- 9)'&'$#("; 0),*-%#, 
+#$#(*%#(&1) ." (1&0*12=&8 +,*0+,)3%)3? 
|-#0 (#+,#$& 2.1.1. F | 
?. !1#<)%2 '*#.I#0)8"* 300 000 *(,# ( RandD +,#*-%. 
B. J$+#127#(&%2 $,*0$%(& 013 0,/4)I =*1*; ) 7&-,"%2 +,#*-%. 
5. B1&4#0&,3 #.>*8/ :-#'#8)5*$-#8/ +#0K*8/ $%#)8#$%2 (&6*4# +,*0+,)3%)3 (",#$1& '& 1 81'. *(,#. E0'&-# (*'5/,'"* )'(*$%)=)) ( 2 +,#*-%&, $0*1&''"* ( 
+,#61#8, '* #+,&(0&1) $*.3. D (&$ ($* *>* *$%2 (#78#<'#$%2 #%-&7&%2$3 #% #0'#4# +,#*-%&. G,#&'&1)7),#(&( +,#*-%", (" +,)61) - ("(#0/, 5%# +,#*-% ? +,)(*0*% 
- +&0*')@ $%#)8#$%) -#8+&')) '& 200 000 *(,#. G,#*-% B $ (*,#3%'#$%2@ 2/3 '* +#(1)3*% '& %*-/>/@ $%#)8#$%2 -#8+&')), '# $ (*,#3%'#$%2 1\3 8#<*% +,)(*$%) - 
+&0*')@ $%#)8#$%) +,*0+,)3%)3 '& 600 000 *(,#. C&-#; +,#*-% (" +,*0+#5%*%* #$%&()%2? 
 
|-#0 (#+,#$& 1.2.1. Y | 
E$%&()%2 +,#*-% ?, -#%#,"; +,)(*0*% - +&0*')@ $%#)8#$%) +,*0+,)3%)3 '& 200 000 *(,#. 
  
E$%&()%2 +,#*-% B, -#%#,"; $ (*,#3%'#$%2@ 2\3 '* +#(1)3*% '& %*-/>/@ $%#)8#$%2 -#8+&')), '# $ (*,#3%'#$%2@ 1\3 +,)(*0*% - +&0*')@ $%#)8#$%) '& 600 000 
*(,#. 
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!"#$%& '()* ( +,*#$+ - ) 
1. !"#$%&#'( %)*+,- ./%0%,12+3/%,- 4%&5+,- 1 4'#61"70% 68)'#00%9 3:'#:+$11, 3:%1,%3:7 6#;+9 <1',8 6 :+/-*+, $%&- 6%='%3"# 0# 600 000 +6'%. 
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Appendix 3. Profile of the respondents  
  Total Sweden Estonia Ukraine !   Total Sweden Estonia Ukraine 
Respondents (per 
country) 58 11 24 23 ! Respondents (per country) 58 11 24 23 
Age (years)   ! Engagement into business         
min 22 26 26 22 ! Employee( receive salary) 32 4 10 18 
max 60 58 52 60 !
Employee( receive salary and own shares of 
the company) 10 3 3 4 
average 39 38 40 38 ! Owner/Co-owner 16 4 11 1 
st. div 8.6 10 8.4 8.5 ! Industry of company         
mode 33 33 45 33 ! Finance 3  1 2 
Gender Respondents ! Trade 16  9 7 
Male 34 8 19 7 ! Production 11 3 4 4 
Female 24 3 5 16 ! Services 24 3 8 13 
Working on current 
position (years)         ! Other (IT, Housing) 11 5 4 2 
Min 0.5 0.5 1 1 ! Education         
Max 20 11 18 20 ! High school/ Profession school 6 0 6 0 
Average 6.7 4 7 7 !
Higher education (Economics, Finance, 
Mathematics) 38 8 11 19 
St.Div 5 4 5 6 ! Higher education (other) 14 3 7 4 
Mode 10 2 10 10 ! Position         
Work experience in 
financial field         ! CEO 20 7 11 2 
Min 0.5 0.5 3 2 ! Chairman (member) of the board 4 1 3   
Max 40 25 25 40 ! Head of the project 2  1 1 
Average 12 11 11 13 ! Business developer 1 1    
St.Div 7 9 6 7.7 ! Entrepreneur 1  1   
Mode 10 25 10 11 ! Other management 5 1 1 3 
Company Size         ! CFO 16 1 6 9 
Micro 19 3 15 1 ! Chief accountant and controller 4  1 3 
Small 17 4 6 7 ! Director deputy in economy and finance 4   4 
Medium 9 1 1 7 ! Director of audit department 1   1 
Large 13 3 2 8 ! !! !! !! !! !!
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RESÜMEE 
 
FINANTSJUHTIDE RISKIKALDUVUS:  
RIIKIDEVAHELINE VÕRDLUS 
 
Anastasiia Linnas 
 
Riigi majandus on keeruline süsteem, kus finants-, tööstus- ja demograafilised 
protsessid on üksteisega tihedalt läbipõimunud. Kui analüüsida sellist keerukat 
süsteemi, on praktiliselt võimatu teha täpseid ennustusi, mis peegeldaksid reaalse 
majanduse seisu tulevikus – igal juhul tulevad ette mõningad kõrvalekaldumised. 
Seevastu saab ennustada mõninga tõenäosusega trende, ja stsenaariume ning arvata 
suundumusi ja indikaatoreid.  
Rääkides tõenäosusest, puutume samal ajal tihedalt kokku riski temaatikaga Näiteks 
teatud sündmuse toimumine mingi kindlusega tähendab et eksisteerib vastupidine risk, 
mil sündmus ei toimu.  
Klassikalises “homo economicuse” teoorias peetakse indiviidi ratsionaalseks ja ta 
otsustused toetuvad kasulikkuse funktsioonile. Vastupidiselt sellele, käitumuslikus 
rahanduse teoorias langetab indiviid otsuseid lähtudes oma subjektiivsetest ja 
irratsionaalsetest uskumustest.  Seega sellised parameetrid nagu riskikalduvus, riski 
taju, riskitaluvus määratleksid majandussubjektide riskantsete otsuste tegemist.  
Eelnevad uuringud riski-võtmise ja käitumise valdkonnas on peamiselt viidud läbi 
tudengite, leibkondade ja individuaalsete investorite seas. Paljud tööd finantsteemalise 
riskikäitumise uuringutes on tehtud investeerimisportfoolio, väärtpaberi turu 
fluktuatsiooni ja ettevõtte dividendipoliitika teemadel. Seevastu kaasagne 
finantsmajandus ei ole ainult väärtpaberi turg, kuna ettevõtted on kaasatud erinevatesse 
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finantssuhetesse läbi investeerimisprojektide, laenude, kapitalistruktuuri strateegiate jne. 
Finantsjuhid vastutavad sageli finantsotsuste eest ja nende vaated finantsteemadele 
mõjutavad ettevõtte finantsstrateegiat ja kokkuvõttes kogu riigi majanduslikku kliimat. 
Meie arvates on tähtis uurida finantsjuhtide käitumist erinevates 
majanduskeskkondades. 2008. aasta finants-manaduslik kriis paljastas irratsionaalsete ja 
riskantsete valikute võimalikke tagajärgi, mis tõstab selle töö teema aktuaalsust. 
Riskikalduvust mõjutavate faktorite mõistmine, kui ka tähtsaimate otsustajate 
riskikäitumise eelistusprofiilide koostamine aitab parandada finantsprognooside 
koostmist nii mikro - väikeettevõtte, kui ka makro - rahvusliku majanduse tasandil.  
Autor eeldab, et juhtide riskikalduvust mõjutab ärikeskkond, organisatsiooni kui ka 
kultuuri normid. Uurimistöö eesmärgiks on leida finantsjuhtide riskikalduvuse 
sarnasused, erinevused ja mustrid erinevates ärikeskkondades võrreldes Eesti, Rootsi ja 
Ukraina finantsjuhtide suhtelist riskitaluvust. Eesmärgi täitmiseks on püstitatud 
järgmised ülesanded: 
• analüüsida eksisteerivate riski-võtmise käitumise konseptsioone majanduses.  
• koostada kokkuvõtlik riskitaluvuse teooria raamistik skikalduvuse; 
• koostada eelnevate uuringute kohta ülevaatlik analüüs; 
• koostada küsimustik, mis võimaldab hinnata juhtide riskikalduvust lähtudes 
rahanduslikust vaatenurgast; 
• koostada kolme riigi majanduskeskkonna ülevaade, mille põhjal kirjeldada 
finantsjuhtide profiili Eestis, Rootsis ja Ukrainas; 
• võrrelda kolme riigi finantsjuhtide eelistuste erinevusi riski käitumises.  
Selles uuringus testitakse kuus paari hüpoteese finantsjuhtide riskikalduvuse kohta. 
Selleks viidi läbi küsimustik ja saadud tulemusi analüüsiti kasutades graafilisi, 
statistilisi ja matemaatilisi meetodeid. 
Toetudes teoreetilistele konseptsioonidele ja töös püstitatud eesmärkidele, sünteesis 
autor raamistiku, mis kirjeldab peamisi riskikalduvust mõjutavaid tegureid, mida 
kirjeldatakse riskikalduvuse ringmudelis. Mudel on esitletud kolmes peamises 
dimensioonis, mida peaks arvestama majandussubjektide riskikalduvuse hindamisel: 
kontekst, raamistik ja isikupära.  
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Kõiki kolme dimensiooni analüüsitakse uuringus. Kontekst analüüsi kasutatakse kolme 
riigi majandustingimuste võrdluseks, kus on kasutatud objektiicseid allikaid nagu 
International Finance Corporation, Maailma Pank ja Euroopa Komisjon. Kahte 
ülejäänud dimensiooni, raamistikku ja isikupära, analüüsitakse toetudes küsimustiku 
tulemustele.  
2. Konteksti parameter käsitleb probleemi laiast vaatenurgast, mis koosneb neljast 
erinevast tasandist: uuringu asukohariik, probleemi sisu, otsuse langetamise tasand 
ja otsuse langetaja. Käesolevas uuringus on uuritud kolme riiki – Rootsi, Eesti ja 
Ukraina erinevast perspektiivist: üldised manaduslikud tingimused, ärikeskkond ja 
organisatsiooni kultuur.  
Riikidevaheline analüüs viitab sellele, et Ukraina majandus on seotud kõrgete riskidega, 
peamiselt ebastabiilse poliitika, sotsiaalse ja manadusliku keskkonna pärast. Ukraina 
esindab üleminekumajandusega riiki, kus majandusüksused tegutsevad suure 
määramatuse tingimustes. Eesti majanduses esineb palju vähem riske võrreldes 
Ukrainaga, kuid Eesti majanduse avatuse pärast on see väga sõltuv välistrendidest, mis 
muudab majandusüksusi ülemääraselt kõrgete riskide aktsepteerimise suhtes 
ettevaatlikuks. Rootsi majandus on kolmest riigist enim arenenud ja riskidele 
vastupidav, mis on tugeva valitsuse positisooni, Rootsi ettevõtete kõrge 
konkurentsivõime ja märkimisväärsete finantsressursside kättesaadavuse tulemus. 
Rootsi majanduse riski tase on madal, kuid enamik ettevõtetest, mis tegutsevad 
rahvusvahelisel turul on sõltuvuses üldistest maailma majandustrendidest.  
Rootsi organisatsioonid on Eesti ja Ukraina omadest enam liberaalsed. Nende 
organisatsiooni iseloomustab mõõdukas kontrolli süsteem ja võrdõiguslik/lame 
organisatsiooni struktuur, kus otsuseid võetakse vastu grupiti ja vastutus on jagatud 
võrdelt kõigi liikmete vahel. Eesti juhid on pigem ülesannetele orienteeritud ja 
keskenduvad isiklikule edule; nad käituvad reeglitele vastavalt ja sellega vähendavad 
määramatust. Ukraina organisatsioonid on kõige hierarhilisema struktuuriga, kus 
tippjuhid omavad otsustamisvõimu ja vastutavad erinevate valdkondade eest.  
Riskid võivad esile tulla erinevates eluvaldkondades ja kalduvus võtta riske või nendest 
eemale hoida oleneb samuti proleemist enesest. Käesolev uuring keskendub ainult 
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majandusriskidele, mis on põhjuseks, et kõik küsimustikus esitatud küsimused 
väljendavad majanduslikke probleeme. Selleks, et koostada vastajatest terviklikum ja 
parem ülevaade uuriti nii isiklikke kui ka ärivaldkonnaga seotud otsuseid.  
3. Raamistik viitab probleemi kirjeldusele, mida otsuse langetaja peab lahendama ja 
mis on selles uuringus manipuleeritav tegur. Uuringus püstitati ja testiti 6 hüpoteesi 
paari, mis kajastavad erinevaid alternative. Tulemused näitavad, et probleemi 
raamistik mõjutab kolme riigi otuse langetamist erineva jõuga.  
Tulemused näitasid, et kui otsustusprobleem on esitatud majanduskasvu valguses, kus 
tulemuste ajalugu on hea ning esitletud positiivselt on juhid riskikartlikumad kui 
neutraalsets majandustingimustes. 
Vastavalt Shapira (1997), MacGrimmon ja Wehrung (1986), Bromiley (2001) 
uuringutega otsustati testida, kuidas üldine majanduslik situatsioon ja ettevõtte vahtute 
tulemuste ajalugu mõjutaksid juhtimisotsuseid. Senised tulemused on näidanud, et kui 
probleem on püstitatud majanduskasvu ja ettevõtte heade tulemustega ajaloo 
tingimustes ning on üldiselt positiivselt esitatud (võimalus teenida), kalduvad juhid 
võtma riskikartlikku otsust palju enam kui neutraalsetes majanduslikes tingimustes. 
Seega võeti vastu H
1
1
: majanduskasvu ja ettevõtte heade tulemuste ajaloo tingimustes, 
juhid ei võtaks täiendavaid riske kui omavad võimalust ettevõtte lisaväärtuse loomiseks.  
Seevastu Rootsi juhtide seas olid vastuse tulemused vastupidised ja kinnitasid autori 
eeldust et heades ja stabiilsetes majandustingimustes on juhid altimad võtma riske. Seda 
tulemust peab testima edaspidistes uuringutes, kuna vastajate hulk Rootsis ei olnud 
suur, mis ei luba pidada tulemust kinnitatuks.  
Küsimused negatiivse sõnastusega (tekib kahjum) lisa informatsioon positiivsetest 
majanduslikest tingimustest ei ole mõjutanud juhtimisotsuseid ja seega tulemused 
lähtusid üldisest kalduvusest võtta riske kui ollakse kahjumlikus situatsioonis. Seepärast 
hüpotees H
0
2  võeti vastu: Majanduskasvu ja ettevõtte heade tulemuste ajaloo 
tingimustes, teeksid juhid riskatse otsuse kui sesavad vastamisi ettevõtte väärtuse 
langusega.  
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Üldises majanduslanguse/kriisi ja ettevõtte negatiivsete tulemuste puhul käitusid juhid 
riskikarlikult, seega hüpotees  võeti 3
0
H  vastu: Majanduslanguse/kriisi ja ettevõtte 
väärtuse languse tingimustes väldiksid juhid riske kui neil on võimalus tõsta ettevõtte 
väärtust, vaid hoopis valiksid kindla tulemusega alternatiivi.  
Rootsi vastajate tulemused erinesid; 3
0
H  tingimustes enamik vastajaid valisid riskantse 
käitumise. Kuna vastajate arv Rootsis oli väike, ei saa pidada saadud tulemust 
kinnitatuks ja küsimus jäeb avatuks tulevasteks diskussioonideks.  
Uuringu tulemused kinnitasid Shapira ja March (1987), MacGrimmon ja Wehrungi 
(1986) tulemusi, et enamik juhte käituksid palju riskantsemalt juhul kui nende ettevõte 
on ebaõnnestumas. Selle tulemusena, 4
1
H  võeti vastu: Majanduslanguse/kriisi ja 
halbade ettevõtte tulemuste ning väärtuse langemise tingimustes, oleksid juhid riskialtid 
kui seisavad vastamisi ettevõtte veelgi suurema väärtuse langusega.  
Samas see hüpotees ei leidnud kinnitust Eesti vastajate seas. Tulemused näitasid, et 
majanduslanguse/kriisi tingimuste ja ettevõtte on juba kaotanud suure osa oma 
väärtusest, eelistaksid juhid olla riskikartlikud ja vältida riskantseid otsuseid, kaotades 
sellega kindla osa ettevõtte väärtusest. Seda erinevust võib seletada toetudes Eesti 
vastajate profiilile, kuna enamik juhte töötavad mikro ja väikese suurusega ettevõttetes, 
kus ettevõtte väärtuse langus võib lõppeda totaalse pankrotiga, samas kui Ukraina 
ettevõtete juhid näevad sarnaseid kaotusi suure ettevõtte perspektiivist kui kahjumit.  
Uuringus oletatakse, et üldises majandusliku kriisi tingimustes, tiheda konkurentsi 
korral võrreldes neutraalsete majandustingimustega, oleksid juhid altimad katkestama 
ebaõnnestunud investeeringuid, See hüpotees leidis kinnitust Eesti ja Rootsi vastajate 
seas, ja seepärast nende riikide kohta võeti vastu hüpotees H0. Ukraina vastajate hulgas 
oli tulemus hoopiski vastupidine, seepärast võeti vastu hüpotees H1. 
Katse 2.2 tulemused näitasid, et 6
1
H  peaks võetama vastu: Selleks, et otsustada ja 
eraldada projektile lisa vahendeid, nõuaksid juhid ettevõtte heade tulemuste korral 
projekti kõrgemat edukusnäitajat kui ettevõte halvade tulemuste korral.  
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Üldiselt saadi uuringus tõendeid, et Ukraina juhtide käitumine, võrreldes eesti ja Rootsi 
juhtidega, langeb enam ekstreemsustesse - nende seas esineb keskmiselt riskantsem 
käitumine dramaatilistes tingimustes ja keskmiselt kõrgem riskikartlikus soosivates 
tingimustes. Eesti vastajate seas raamistiku tingimused mängisid vähem rolli ja nende 
vastused jagunesid mõõdukamalt.   
4. Isikupära on väga kompleksne tegur mida võib käsitleda erinevatest vaatenurkadest 
arvestades: sotsiaaldemograafilised omadusi, isiku väärtushinnanguid ja eelistusi, 
eelnevaid kogemusi ja harjumusi standartsete situatsioonide lahendamisel. Töö 
lihtsustamiseks iga vastaja isikliku profiili krijeldamise asemel loodi küsimustiku 
vastuste põhjal iga riigi keskmine juhi profiil. 
Me tulemused viitavad sellele, et Ukraina ja Eesti juhid ei riskiks isikliku kapitaliga ja 
eelistaksid kindlaid investeerimisvõimalusi, nagu investeerimist kinnisvarasse; nad on 
enam keskendunud kiirekasvulistele võimalustele kui Rootsi kolleegid ja seepärast ka 
vähem kannatlikud. Kõigi kolme riigi juhid peavad investeerimist enda ärisse parimaks 
raha jaotamise viisiks – millest võib järeldada et kõigi vastajate enesehinnang on kõrge. 
Üldiselt on Ukraina juhid tuleviku suhtes kõige pessimistlikumad ja Rootsi juhid kõige 
optimistlikumad.  
Töös käsitletud mudel ja küsimustik tõestasid võimekust uurida ja kirjledada 
riikidevahelisi erinevusi majandussubjektide riski käitumises. Uuringus saadud tulemusi 
saab täiendada kui lisada veel üks dimensioon – otsustaja valiku eelistuse 
tugevus/ulatus. Suurema hulga vastajate kaasamine annaks võimaluse hinnata selliste 
parameetrite nagu: kultuur, probleemi raamistik, isikupära ja riskikalduvus, mõju 
suurust Üks võimalikke ettepanekuid edaspidisteks uuringuteks on võrrelda 
finantsjuhtide riskikalduvust ja ettevõtete tulemuslikkust. Samuti oleks huvitav uurida 
riski-võtmise käitumuslikke muutusi üle pika aja.  
 
